RSVP Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP drafttschofenigrsvpdoi00.txt

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RSVP Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP
(draft-tschofenig-rsvp-doi-00.txt)

• Authors
• Hannes Tschofenig
• Henning Schulzrinne

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The Problem

• There is no dynamic key management for the RSVP
  Integrity Object.
• Adding authentication and key exchange protocols
  to RSVP itself requires modifications to the RSVP
  protocol (e.g. new messages, different RSVP
  message handling, fragmentation handling, etc.)

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Proposal

• Separate the two security protocols
• Authentication and key establishment
• RSVP signaling message protection (data origin
  authentication, integrity and replay protection)
• Current draft leaves RSVP Integrity Object as it
  is (although we see room for improvement)
• Proposal
• allows incremental deployment (use dynamic key
  management where necessary keep the rest with
  statically configured keys)
• reuses known key management protocols (IKE and
  KINK)
• is primarily targeted for intra- and inter-domain
  RSVP signaling

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How does it work?

• The ISAKMP framework allows IKE not only to
  establish IPsec SAs but also other security
  associations.
• Although rarely used in the past a few proposals
  have been published
• MAP (see draft-arkko-map-doi-07.txt)
• SMPLS (see draft-tsenevir-smpls-doi-01.txt)
• GKMP
• The RSVP DoI draft therefore defines which
  parameters have to be exchanged in order to
  create a security association for the usage with
  RSVP (and the RSVP Integrity Object in
  particular).

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Message Flow


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9
RSVP Module
RSVP Module
Key Engine
Key Engine
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7
10
2
6
4
3
IKE / KINK with RSVP DoI
IKE / KINK with RSVP DoI
Authentication and key exchange
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RSVP Router A
RSVP Router B
simplified requires more roundtrips
Message flow covers the case where no appropriate
security association is available. The key
engine triggers the key management to create one.
Note that most communication is API specific and
does not require protocol interaction between the
RSVP nodes.
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Next steps

• Working on the draft we identified some open
  issues
• Identities used in the Identification payload
  require more details
• REPLAY-STATUS notification
• authorization and access control (for the given
  usage environment)
• Currently the document does not address
• protection of multicast RSVP signaling messages
• confidentiality protection