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The PPVL Isolation Room: Infection Risk and Policy Implications

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Dr Cath Noakes, Dr Louise Fletcher, Dr Andy Sleigh. University of Leeds ... Aim to contain most infectious patients OR protect those most at risk ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: The PPVL Isolation Room: Infection Risk and Policy Implications


1
The PPVL Isolation Room Infection Risk and
Policy Implications
  • Dr Cath Noakes, Dr Louise Fletcher, Dr Andy
    Sleigh
  • University of Leeds
  • William Booth, Blanca Beato-Arribas
  • BSRIA Ltd
  • Nigel Tomlinson
  • Department of Health October 2009

2
Content
  • Isolation rooms and need for study
  • Tracer methodology
  • Leeds Chamber Results
  • Application to the PPVL mock-up
  • Infection Risk Analysis
  • Implications for Build and Operation

3
Isolation Rooms
  • Aim to contain most infectious patients OR
    protect those most at risk
  • Pressure differential controls transmission with
    outside world
  • Negative for infectious patients
  • Positive for immunocompromised
  • Who sets operation? Is it safe?
  • What about the airflow within the space?
  • Essential understand risk outside and inside
    space
  • under normal and failure conditions

4
The PPVL concept
5
How do we measure performance?
  • What is the risk of airborne transmission to or
    from a healthcare worker in room?
  • What is the risk of transmission to those outside
    the room?
  • How does the risk change with events?

Development and Validation of CFD models and
tracer techniques to mimic the behaviour of
airborne microorganisms
Application to PPVL mock-up to evaluate physical
behaviour
Combine with risk models to understand exposure
Set performance requirements and operation
validation method
6
Tracer Study Objectives
  • Compare the performance of 4 tracer techniques in
    a controlled chamber environment
  • Nitrous Oxide gas tracer, Inert NaCl particles,
    Bioaerosols containing B subtilus or S aureus
    bacteria, CFD model
  • Establish how well inert tracer techniques can
    represent the behaviour of small bacteria
    particles
  • Understand behaviour of tracers across three
    ventilation regimes under transient and steady
    state conditions
  • Apply inert tracer techniques to PPVL mock-up to
    establish mixing, decay rate and leakage

7
Leeds Chamber Set-up
Wall supply (Low High)
Nebuliser port (A)
Wall extract (Low High)
8
Tracers
  • Nitrous Oxide
  • Constant release from cylinder
  • Sampled with gas analyser
  • NaCl Particles
  • 5 NaCl solution in collison nebuliser
  • Samples 0.5-5mm with laser particle counter
  • Bioaerosols
  • Bacterial culture in collison nebuliser
  • Anderson sampler to collect on TSA then
    incubation and enumeration
  • Three ventilation regimes at 10 ACH.
  • All tracers released via tubing to the DIN man
    (70W)
  • Measurements made at extract during build up and
    decay
  • Measurements made at 5 sample locations during
    steady state
  • Room sealed and unoccupied during tests
  • Mechanical air change rate measured with
    balometer for all ventilation set-ups

9
Leeds Chamber CFD model
  • Model built using Fluent
  • Unstructured tet grid with 360000 cells
  • Steady state simulations at 10 ACH
  • Passive scalar released from DIN man to represent
    pathogen
  • K-e turbulence model
  • Boussinesq model with heat flux on DIN man

10
Leeds Chamber NaCl Tracer Results
Ventilation regime 2 High wall supply, low wall
extract
11
Leeds Chamber Tracer Decay
  • Presented relative to room air change rate as a
    k-factor
  • Similar rates across 3 techniques - best
    comparison with 3-5 mm particles
  • Short-circuiting in regimes V1 and V3
  • Regime V2 showed good mixing and stable airflow

12
Leeds Chamber Steady State Distribution
  • Ventilation regime 2 high wall supply, low wall
    extract
  • Normalised concentration around 1 for all tracers
    good mixing in space
  • Bioaerosol behaviour similar to inert tracers
  • Best comparison with 3-5 mm particles

13
Leeds Chamber CFD ResultsV1 Low wall supply,
high wall extract
2.90 2.60 2.30 2.00 1.70 1.40 1.10 0.90 0.60 0.30
0.00
Vertical Plane shows plume and significant
gradient
low
Horizontal Plane shows low concentration and
limited mixing
high
14
Leeds Chamber CFD ResultsV2 High supply, low
extract
2.90 2.60 2.30 2.00 1.70 1.40 1.10 0.90 0.60 0.30
0.00
Vertical Plane shows plume and slight gradient
high
Horizontal Plane shows good mixing - similar to
experiment
low
15
Tracer Methodology Summary
  • Good comparison between all tracer techniques
    suggests that inert particles or gas tracers can
    represent bioaerosols
  • Best comparison in 3-5mm particle range
  • Inert particle tracers offer realistic and safe
    tracer technique for assessing risk
  • CFD results gave similar mixing and insight into
    vertical concentration gradients
  • Ventilation regime strong effect on mixing across
    all tracers
  • General implications for isolation room design
    and risk to healthcare workers

16
PPVL Tracer Study
  • Compare N2O and Salt tracers in PPVL mock up
  • Use techniques to assess various scenarios
  • Release - patient, lobby, heat loads
  • Room challenges - fan failure, effect of doors
  • Combine with CFD, smoke tests and anemometry -
    quantitative data for risk evaluation

17
Decay Results
  • Tracer measured at extract
  • Divided by mechanical ACH to determine k-factor
  • Good comparison between Salt and N2O
  • K-factors typical of well mixed room

18
Steady State Behaviour
19
PPVL Tracer Summary
  • Same good comparison between tracer techniques in
    PPVL
  • Best in 1-5mm particle range
  • Results consistent within these tests and with
    previous N2O tests
  • Both techniques offer realistic method of
    physically modelling small airborne pathogen
    transport in ventilated rooms
  • Both techniques can give quantitative data on
    steady state and transient performance of a space

20
Infection Risk Scenarios
  • Normal operation (doors closed)
  • Good mixing inside room with k factors 0.8-0.9
  • Source dilution 3 log reduction
  • Protection to outside gt 5 log reduction
  • Transient mode (doors open)
  • Mixing inside room remains good
  • 7 air escapes
  • Impact (hence risk) depends on duration
  • Complete failure (eg. fan fail)
  • Leakage determined by air tightness
  • Room recovers protection when normal operation
    resumed

21
Healthcare Worker Risk
  • Three zone mixing model to show effect of
    internal airflow
  • Assume clean supply air and no backflows
  • Patient releases infectious material at 60
    quanta/hour over 1 minute period
  • HCW inhaled dose based on breathing rate of 8
    l/min
  • K-factors of 0.8 and 0.4 to model good and poor
    mixing

Bulk room air
En-suite
Near patient zone
Lobby
22
HCW Pathogen Concentration
Well mixed room (k 0.8) - PPVL
Poorly mixed room (k 0.4)
23
HCW Inhaled Dose
Well mixed room (k 0.8) - PPVL
Poorly mixed room (k 0.4)
24
Transient Performance
25
Implications for Build
  • When built and operated correctly
  • Designed to be low risk even under transient and
    failure modes
  • Designed to offer high level of protection
    without significant user intervention
  • Requires high quality construction - air
    tightness at least 5 m3/(h.m2)
  • Pressure stabilizer crucial to air mixing and
    lobby pressurisation
  • Smoke testing can indicate performance
  • Tracer testing can quantify and validate
    performance

26
Implications for Safe Operation
  • Infection risk can never be zero
  • Actual risk will depend on pathogen - Airborne
    focus
  • Infectious diseases TB, SARs, pandemic influenza
    (?) plus unknown conditions
  • Immunocompromised Hospital plus outdoor
    (Aspergillus)
  • Inherent environmental protection can be
    compromised by poor operation
  • PPE and good user operation further reduce risks
  • Transmission to/from outside Good hygiene
    practices, routine operation with doors closed,
    training to react in event of failure
  • Transmission within room PPE (eg.
    mask/respirator) appropriate to pathogen and
    activity

27
Thank You for ListeningAny Questions?
  • Dr Cath Noakes
  • Pathogen Control Engineering Institute
  • University of Leeds
  • C.J.Noakes_at_leeds.ac.uk
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