NEMO Route Optimization Civil Aeronautical Requirements (draft-ietf-mext-aero-reqs) - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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NEMO Route Optimization Civil Aeronautical Requirements (draft-ietf-mext-aero-reqs)

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Including individual submission, prior to the WG draft, this ... Correctly called 'pixie dust' New: Apps ability to use IPsec was moved to another requirement ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: NEMO Route Optimization Civil Aeronautical Requirements (draft-ietf-mext-aero-reqs)


1
NEMO Route OptimizationCivil Aeronautical
Requirements(draft-ietf-mext-aero-reqs)
  • Presenter Wesley Eddy
  • Verizon / NASA GRC
  • weddy_at_grc.nasa.gov
  • IETF 71 - MEXT WG - March 2008

2
Draft Status
  • Including individual submission, prior to the WG
    draft, this is the 5th version of the document
  • Feedback incorporated from over a dozen
    contributors
  • From the IETF NEMO and MEXT WGs
  • From the aeronautics community via ICAO meetings
    and the MPI mailing list
  • Actively worked on during the MEXT interim
  • Believed to be ready for last call

3
Recent Main Changes
  • Clarified wording on high-level requirements
  • Changed requirement on loss to also require NOT
    duplicating packets
  • Completely rewrote security requirement with more
    specific goals

4
Security Requirement
  • Old
  • IPsec MUST be usable over the RO scheme, and the
    data used to make RO decisions MUST be
    authenticable, perhaps using some form of IPsec
  • Correctly called pixie dust
  • New
  • Apps ability to use IPsec was moved to another
    requirement
  • PIES doman - no additional requirement beyond
    standard MIPv6 RO.
  • ATC/AOS domains
  • The RO scheme MUST NOT further expose MNPs on
    the wireless link than already is the case for
    NEMO basic support
  • The RO scheme MUST permit validation of the
    COAs
  • The RO scheme MUST ensure that only explicitly
    authorized MRs are able to perform a binding
    update for a specific MNP.

5
ATS/AOS Security RequirementExplanation and
Rationale
  • CoA validation
  • May assume ingress filtering by all access
    network providers
  • BU receiver can correlate a BUs source address
    with the decrypted alternate CoA (WG to discuss)
  • MR authorization to perform BU for specific MNPs
  • May assume trust relationships between MR and
    mobility anchor points topologically near to
    CNs, but not necessarily with every CN itself.
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