ROLE OF ICT IN WAR AGAINST TERROR

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ROLE OF ICT IN WAR AGAINST TERROR SURVEILLANCE
AND SENSORS

• BY
•  
• LT COL MALAY SANKAR PAL

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INTRODUCTION

• AREA DOMINATION FUNDAMENTAL ACTION IN WAR
  AGAINST TERROR
• INVOLVES ACCOUNTABILITY OF AN INDIVIDUAL IN TERMS
  OF PHYSICAL PRESENCE AND ACTIVITIES
• SURVEILLANCE GRID MOST EFFECTIVE TOOL FOR AREA
  DOMINATION

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SURVEILLANCE PHILOSOPHY

• NO GAP PATTERN
• 24X7 COVERAGE
• REDUNDANCY
• OVERLAP
• MIX OF SENSORS
• ALTERNATE POSITIONS
• SECONDARY TASK
• COMMAND AND CONTROL HIERARCHY

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FACTORS INFLUENCING SURVEILLANCE

• TECHNICAL FACTORS. INCLUDE
• INTENDED TARGET AND ITS RESOLUTION
• DISTANCE COVERED
• NOISE IMMUNITY
• ABILITY TO FUNCTION IN ALL WEATHER TERRAIN
  CONDITIONS
• OUTPUT FORMAT
• COMPATIBILITY FOR NETWORKING
• PORTABILITY
• ECM SIGNATURE AND ECCM CAPABILITY
• POWER AND OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS
• CAPABILITY OF WORKING IN UNMANNED MODE
• SELF DIAGNOSTICS OTHER SMART OPERATIONAL
  FEATURES
• REQUIREMENTS OF TRAINING

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FACTORS INFLUENCING SURVEILLANCE

• TACTICAL FACTORS. INCLUDE
• THREAT PERCEPTION
• OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES
• SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
• BALANCE OF FORCE
• ENEMY ACTIVITIES
• AVAILABILITY OF LOCAL RESOURCES
• LOGISTICS
• GROUND CONDITIONS

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COMPONENTS OF SURVEILLANCE GRID
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COMPONENTS OF SURVEILLANCE GRID
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COMPONENTS OF SURVEILLANCE GRID
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COMPONENTS OF SURVEILLANCE GRID
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COMPONENTS OF SURVEILLANCE GRID
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COMPONENTS OF SURVEILLANCE GRID
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COMPONENTS OF SURVEILLANCE GRID
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COMPONENTS OF SURVEILLANCE GRID
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COMPONENTS OF SURVEILLANCE GRID
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COMPONENTS OF SURVEILLANCE GRID
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COMPONENTS OF SURVEILLANCE GRID
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COMPONENTS OF SURVEILLANCE GRID
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COMPONENTS OF SURVEILLANCE GRID
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COMPONENTS OF ICT
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COMPONENTS OF ICT

• COMMUNICATION NETWORK
•   COMMAND AND CONTROL SERVER SYSTEM
•   DECISION SUPPORT SERVER SYSTEM
•   WAR GAMING
•   SECURITY

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RECOMMENDATIONS
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RECOMMENDATIONS

•   COMMUNICATION CENTRES SHOULD BE SECURED
  THROUGH MIL GRADE VPN TUNNELS
• DIFFERENT ROUTES CAN USE DIFFERENT
  CRYPTOGRAPHIC ENGINES
•   JUDICIOUS USE OF CONVENTIONAL TOOLS e.g.
  INTRUSION DETECTION AND PREVENTION, FIREWALLS,
  ANTIVIRUS, ANTI SPAM, BULK ENCRYPTION UNITS ETC.
•   TIME SERVER FOR TIME SYNCHRONIZATION OF ALL
  CRYPTO UNITS IN THE NETWORK. KEY CHANGE OPERATION
  MUST BE TIME SYNCHRONIZED ACROSS THE NETWORK

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RECOMMENDATIONS

• ROBUST KEY DISTRIBUTION MECHANISM TO UPDATE THE
  KEYS AND CRYPTO ALGORITHM IN CASE OF A COMPROMISE
  IN SECURITY
•  STRONG CHALLENGE RESPONSE BASED AUTHENTICATION
  IN THE SUBSCRIBER TERMINALS, PREFERABLY WITH
  MULTI FACTOR BIOMETRICS BASED ACCESS CONTROL
•  GATEWAYS TO PROVIDE INTEROPERABILITY ONLY AT THE
  PROTOCOL CONVERSION AND SIGNALING TRANSLATION
  LEVEL AND NEVER AT CRYPTO TRANSLATION LEVELS

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RECOMMENDATIONS

• SUBSCRIBER TERMINALS TO IMPLEMENT END-TO-END
  ENCRYPTION OF ALL PAYLOADS VIZ. VOICE, VIDEO
  CONFERENCING AND DATA. FOLLOWING ISSUES
  IMPORTANT-
•  TRAFFIC MUST NOT BE DECRYPTED AND RE-ENCRYPTED
  ANYWHERE IN THE NETWORK
•  SHOULD WORK TRANSPARENTLY INCLUDING END-TO-END
  ENCRYPTION IRRESPECTIVE OF THE UNDERLYING
  TECHNOLOGY DEPLOYED e.g. PSTN, GSM, CDMA, IP
  BROADBAND, MIL NETWORK ETC.
•  CONVENTION AL TOOLS e.g. FIREWALLS OR INTRUSION
  PREVENTION SYSTEMS ALONG WITH A TRAFFIC SHAPER
  AND QoS ENGINE SHOULD PRIORITIZE VARIOUS TYPES
  AND GRADES OF TRAFFIC ON THE NETWORK

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RECOMMENDATIONS

• USE MILITARIZED VoIP PROTOCOL FOR VOICE
  ENCRYPTION WHICH SHOULD ORIGINATE A
  PRE-DESIGNATED PRIORITIZED PACKET FROM THE
  SUBSCRIBER TERMINAL
• ONLY PLAIN VOICE CALLS SHOULD BE DELIVERED
  THROUGH IP PBX AND VOICE MULTIPLEXERS

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CONCLUSION

• MATURED TECHNOLOGY FOR BATTLE FIELD MANAGEMENT
  SYSTEM ALREADY AVAILABLE
• COORDINATED SYNERGY BETWEEN THE OPERATIONAL
  PLANNERS, RD ORGANIZATIONS AND THE INDUSTRY
  REQUIRED TO REALIZE A ROBUST COUNTER TERRORISM
  SYSTEM EXPEDITIOUSLY

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THANKS
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COMMUNICATION NETWORK DESIRED CHARACTERISTICS

•  AVOID BOTTLENECKS OF CURRENT COMMUNICATION
  SYSTEMS VIZ.
• POOR SPECTRUM UTILIZATION
• LOW DATA TRANSFER RATES
• PRE-DEFINED MISSION PLANNING
• INTENTIONAL AND UNINTENTIONAL JAMMING
  ENVIRONMENT
• LACK OF COORDINATION AMONG VARIOUS SECURITY
  AND CIVILIAN NETWORKS
•  
•  

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COMMUNICATION NETWORK DESIRED CHARACTERISTICS

•  USE AN INTEGRATED HYBRID NETWORK BASED ON AN
  AREA BASED TERRESTRIAL NETWORK AND A SATELLITE
  BASED CELESTIAL NETWORK
• INTERFACE FOR THESE TWO NETWORKS SHOULD BE
  THROUGH A TACTICAL SERVICES GATEWAYS
• USE OF NEXT GENERATION NETWORK (NGN) TECHNOLOGY
  BASED ON IPV6
• MUST COVER FULL SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT AND
  VARYING TERRAIN

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COMMUNICATION NETWORK DESIRED CHARACTERISTICS

•   ADOPT LATEST TECHNIQUES TO OPTIMIZE
  THROUGHPUT CHANNEL UTILIZATION e.g.
• COGNITIVE RADIO SYSTEM
• SOFTWARE DEFINED RADIO
• BANDWIDTH HARVESTING
• MOBILE ADHOC NETWORK (MANET)
•   LAST MILE CONNECTIVITY SHOULD BE BASED ON
  CELLULAR COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUES TO CATER FOR
  FLUID AND FLEXIBLE NATURE OF COUNTER TERRORISM
  OPERATIONS

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COMMUNICATION NETWORK DESIRED CHARACTERISTICS

• ENSURE HIGH INFORMATION ASSURANCE BY MAKING
  IT JAM RESISTANT
•   ADEQUATE ECCM MEASURES TO AVOID DETECTION,
  LOCALIZATION AND IDENTIFICATION BY HOSTILE EW
  MEANS

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COMMAND CONTROL SERVER SYSTEM

•   ANY OPERATION CONVENTIONAL OR COUNTER
  TERRORISM INVOLVES A MULTI LAYERED HIERARCHY
  FOR EFFECTIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL CHAIN
• CONNECTS FOOT SOLDIER TO HIGHEST COMMANDER
• MORE CRITICAL IN CASE OF COUNTER TERRORISM
  SINCE IT INVOLVES AGENCIES OF DIFFERENT HUES
• ARMED FORCES i.e. ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE
• SPECIAL FORCES LIKE NATIONAL SECURITY GUARDS
• CENTRAL FORCES e.g. CRPF, BSF OR CISF
• STATE POLICE

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COMMAND CONTROL SERVER SYSTEM

•   IN SUCH A SITUATION ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND
  ITS DISSEMINATION HAS TO BE BASED ON A DEFINED
  OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE
• HAS TO CATER FOR VARIOUS CONTINGENCIES AND
  ROLE OF EACH OF THESE AGENCIES IN SUCH SITUATIONS
  
• OBVIOUSLY FLOW OF INFO AND ACCESS TO IT SHOULD
  BE NEED TO KNOW BASED
• ACCORDINGLY THE SERVER HAS TO CATER FOR EACH
  OF SUCH CONTINGENCIES DEFINED IN THE OPERATIONAL
  DOCTRINE

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DECISION SUPPORT SERVER SYSTEM

• DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR A MULTI AGENCY
  OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE AS CRITICAL
• ISSUES e.g. OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE, VARYING
  CONTINGENCIES, NEED TO KNOW BASED ACCESS TO
  INFORMATION AND ITS DISSEMINATION RELEVANT HERE
  AS WELL
• SOFTWARE TO CATER FOR SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AT
  EVERY LEVEL OF HIERARCHY
• SMOOTH TRANSITION OF DECISION BACK FORTH WITH
  DUE AUTHENTICATION CRITICAL

•   

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WAR GAMING

• A CRITICAL TOOL TO HONE OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE
  IN A SIMULATED ENVIRONMENT
•  
• SERVERS MUST MAKE PROVISION FOR EXTENSIVE WAR
  GAMING TO HONE THE STATE OF OPERATIONAL
  PREPAREDNESS

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SECURITY

• AN EXTREMELY CRITICAL ISSUE WITH INCREASING
  DEPENDENCE ON NETWORK CENTRIC FUNCTIONAL
  ENVIRONMENT AND SIMULTANEOUS INCREASE IN CYBER
  TERRORISM
• WITH THE NGN (NEXT GENERATION NETWORK) NOW A
  REALITY THERE SHOULD BE A WELL DEFINED NETWORK
  SECURITY STRATEGY TO SYNERGIZE TECHNOLOGICAL
  ADVANCEMENTS WITH THREAT PERCEPTIONS

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SECURITY

• STRATEGY SHOULD BE BASED ON FUNDAMENTALS OF
  CYBER SECURITY VIZ.
• AUTHENTICATION
• ACCESS CONTROL
• SECURE STORAGE AND RETRIEVAL
• SECURE COMMUNICATION
• LOGGING AND AUDITING
• INTEGRITY CHECK
• INTRUSION DETECTION AND RESPONSE
• NON REPUDIATION
• PHYSICAL AND GENERAL ASPECTS e.g. HARDENING,
  SOPS, CLASSIFICATION ETC

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SECURITY

• NATIONAL LEVEL SECURITY FRAMEWORK ENCOMPASSING
  FOLLOWING ISSUES-
• ASSESSMENT OF THREATS BOTH INTERNAL AND
  EXTERNAL
• INTERFACING ISSUES BETWEEN DIVERSE NETWORKS
• INTERFACING ISSUES BETWEEN THE MEDIA AND
  SERVICES
• SOLUTION FOR END-TO-END SECURITY
• KEY MANAGEMENT ISSUES
• QoS AND LATENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR VARIOUS TYPES
  OF TRAFFIC

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SECURITY

• CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS SHOULD BE USER
  UPGRADABLE IN THE FIELD TO ADDRESS COMPROMISES
• A CENTRALIZED FRAMEWORK TO ADDRESS ISSUES
  CONCERNING KEY CHANGE SYNCHRONIZATION AND
  ACCORDINGLY PROMULGATE SECURITY POLICIES
• SHOULD BE PLATFORM INDEPENDENT FOR PROCESSING
•   JUDICIOUS MIX OF SECURITY OVERLAY AND EMBEDDED
  SECURITY

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