LESSONS DRAWN FROM THE IMFSUPPORTED PROGRAMS - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

1 / 24
About This Presentation
Title:

LESSONS DRAWN FROM THE IMFSUPPORTED PROGRAMS

Description:

12 completed successfully in compliance with the conditionalities; 1 terminated ... and repayment, and a limited penchant for further debt obligations, as well; ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:38
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 25
Provided by: bnb
Category:

less

Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: LESSONS DRAWN FROM THE IMFSUPPORTED PROGRAMS


1
LESSONS DRAWN FROM THE IMF-SUPPORTED PROGRAMS
  • TSVETAN MANCHEV
  • DEPUTY GOVERNOR
  • BULGARIAN NATIONAL BANK

2
OUTLINE
  • Historical facts
  • Have the goals of the Fund-supported Programs in
    Bulgaria been achieved?
  • Key lessons

3
HISTORY
  • Membership since September 25, 1990
  • 13 programs
  • Types of programs
  • Stand-by Arrangements (10)
  • Contingent Compensatory Financing Facility - CCFF
    (2)
  • Systemic Transformation Facility STF (1)
  • 12 completed successfully in compliance with the
    conditionalities 1 terminated before completion
    the 4th one, concluded in 1996
  • IMF financing over the years
  • 2.1 bln. SDRs for 12 agreements
  • 100 mln. SDRs for the 2004 precautionary
    agreement,

4
OUTSTANDING DEBT TO IMF
5
BULGARIAN SOVEREIGN DEBT SPREAD
6
Promised BUT NOT Delivered1991 1997
  • Lack of political will for reforms, incl.
  • setting an inconsistent monetary policy aimed at
    the achievement of both price stability and
    exchange rate stability under a floating rate
    regime
  • setting an inconsistent and unpredictable fiscal
    policy
  • the lack of large-scale privatization and the
    continuous dominance of the state-ownership of
    assets
  • ill-focused and badly communicated economic
    restructuring and liberalization
  • an excessive public debt burden and a moratorium
    on debt obligations
  • the 1996-1997 crisis.

7
Promised AND Delivered1997 2001
  • Political will and a wide-spread public support
    for the reforms, incl. a switch to
  • a euro-based currency board monetary regime since
    mid-1997
  • a prudent and predictable fiscal policy oriented
    towards debt reduction and limited financing of
    non-reformed state sectors
  • an abrupt large-scale privatization of
    state-owned assets
  • a well focused and consistent policy of market
    liberalization and improvement of the business
    environment
  • enhanced coordination between economic policies.

8
Credible on the road to EMUFrom 2001 - to now
  • Switch towards sustainable development policies,
    incl.
  • enhancing the stability of the euro-based
    currency board regime and preserving this regime
    at the current exchange rate of the Bulgarian Lev
    to the Euro of 1.95583 BGN for 1 Euro until the
    euro adoption
  • a prudent and predictable fiscal policy oriented
    towards a budget surplus, public debt
    restructuring and repayment, and a limited
    penchant for further debt obligations, as well
  • the establishment of a functioning market economy
    capable of withstanding competitive pressures
    within the EU
  • a pre-announced strategy for the euro adoption
    after the fulfillment of the Maastricht criteria
  • an increased economic policy coordination in line
    with the requirements of the Stability and Growth
    Pact and the Lisbon Agenda.

9
LESSONS
  • IMF-supported programs do not guarantee by
    themselves a sustainable development and a
    long-term growth. They are short-term looking and
    their successful accomplishment largely depends
    on the consensus of national authorities about
    the formulated policy mix
  • The IMF expertise and knowledge is effective in
    crises prevention and resolution, but the
    transformation of the achieved results into a
    sustainable development model is still a
    challenge

10
LESSONS
  • 3. IMF-supported Programs should remain
    short-term oriented, because it is the national
    authorities responsibility to build a consensus
    on the nationwide goals of sustainable
    development and growth
  • All national stakeholders participation in the
    discussion of IMF-supported Programs is
    instrumental for their success.

11
The General Conclusion
  • The political will for and the national
    consensus on reforms aimed at long-term
    nationwide (or community-wide) economic goals
    cannot be replaced by short-term IMF-supported
    Programs.

12
BEYOND AND AFTER THE IMF-SUPPORTED PROGRAMS
  • Bulgaria should and will continue the
    co-operation with the IMF through
  • receiving a vast technical assistance from the
    Fund (and other IFIs) and knowledge for the
    future of the global economy
  • providing information on its macroeconomic
    policy, the expected effects, and building up an
    understanding and confidence among the partners.

13
Thank you for your attention!
14
Cross country comparison of GDP per capita
convergence
15
GENERAL GOVERNMENT BALANCE
16
GOVERNMENT DEBT
17
REAL GDP GROWTH
18
INFLATION
19
FOREIGN RESERVES
20
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN BULGARIA
21
SHARE OF THE GROSS CAPITAL FORMATION IN GDP
22
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
23
EXTERNAL POSITION
24
CREDIT TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
About PowerShow.com