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CSCI283 Fall 2005

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Title: CSCI283 Fall 2005


1
Database Security and Privacy
  • CSCI283 Fall 2005
  • GWU

2
Announcements
  • Final Exam December 6, 2006
  • Regular classroom Gelman 607
  • Regular class hours 710-940 pm
  • Syllabus Lectures 6, 8-13
  • Block and Stream Ciphers, Public Key
    Cryptography, Public Key Infrastructure,
    Identity, Authentication, Malicious Logic, Risk
    Analysis, Database Privacy, Information Flow and
    Covert Channels slides and associated readings.

3
Databases provide
  • Shared access
  • Controlled access
  • Data consistency
  • Data integrity
  • Minimal redundancy

4
Database Security Requirements
  • Integrity
  • Physical
  • Logical
  • element
  • Access Control
  • User Authentication
  • Availability
  • Auditability

5
Integrity
  • Physical integrity i.e. response to power
    failures and other physical problems
  • Backup
  • Transaction log to update since previous backup
  • Integrity
  • Field checks
  • Access control and consistency among values
  • Maintaining change logs

6
More Security Requirements
  • Auditability
  • Helps determine if inappropriate disclosure has
    occurred
  • Helps track divulged information to prevent
    inference (example, if it is known that I am a
    woman and over 40, it is known that I am losing
    Calcium)
  • Difficult to record access of fields often a
    field is reported to have been accessed when it
    has not e.g. SELECT all entries with ZIP 20007

7
More Security Requirements
  • Access Control
  • Inference is a problem (fields are related
    knowledge of race can be a good predictor of
    salary, for example)
  • Size and granularity different from access
    control in OS
  • User Authentication
  • DBMS does its own authentication because no
    trusted path between DBMS and OS when DBMS is an
    application program on top of OS
  • Availability important because of shared access
    goal.

8
Integrity and Consistency Two-Phase Update
  • Assign seats to passengers
  • Phase I intent phase
  • Collect all resources required to complete task
  • Shadow values store key data points
  • Committing Set commit-flag. Marks end of intent
  • Phase II commit phase
  • Shadow values are copied

9
Seat assignments
  • intent phase
  • if COMMIT-FLAG SET
  • loop or halt
  • else
  • seat.shadow_name John Doe
  • seat.shadow_flag taken
  • commit phase
  • COMMIT-FLAG SET
  • seat.name seat.shadow_name
  • seat.flag seat.shadow_flag
  • Unset COMMIT-FLAG

10
Consistency - Monitors
  • Checks values for consistency with field type, or
    with rest of database
  • Range comparisons
  • State constraints (for example, if all activities
    completed, COMMIT-FLAG should not be SET. This is
    a state constraint which might not be satisfied
    if power is lost between finishing activities and
    unsetting COMMIT-FLAG)
  • Transition constraints can be difficult to
    implement

11
Sensitive Data
  • Inherently sensitive
  • From a sensitive source (request for information
    to be kept confidential)
  • Declared sensitive by database administrator
  • Part of a sensitive record (information on George
    Bush) or attribute (salary)
  • Sensitive in context of previously-released
    information

12
Access Control
  • Access decisions depend on
  • Availability of data
  • Acceptability of access
  • User Authentication
  • Types of Disclosures
  • Exact
  • Bounds
  • Negative/Positive Result
  • Existence of data
  • Probable value

13
Multilevel Databases
  • Differentiated Security
  • Security at the level of element
  • Two levels not sufficient to represent
    sensitivity of data (hence multilevel)
  • Security of aggregate or function/combination of
    fields might be different from that of individual
    values
  • Not used much

14
Separation
  • Partitioning Each confidentiality level in a
    separate database
  • Difficult to update
  • Difficult for users who can access multiple
    security levels
  • Encryption
  • Problems?
  • Block Chaining
  • Integrity Lock
  • Secure hash of element position sensitivity
    stored with element
  • Sensitivity Lock
  • Identifier Sensitivity encrypted

15
Inference
  • Believe a new fact based on other information
    (Sweeney)
  • Suppose
  • Count(Female AND Caucasian AND HIV) 1
  • And we know there is exactly one Female Caucasian
    in the database, Mary Smith
  • We know Mary Smith has HIV even though we did not
    ask that, and the database would not reveal that
  • One way to limit inference is to not allow
    divulging a small value

16
Other methods for inference
  • count(a AND b AND c)
  • count(a) count(a AND NOT(b AND c))
  • Count(F AND C AND HIV)
  • Count(F) Count(F AND NOT(C AND HIV))
  • Count(F) Count(F AND (NOT C OR NOT HIV)

b
a
c
17
Example of inference
  • m1 median(S1)
  • m2 median(S2)
  • m1 lt m2
  • S2 ? S1
  • What can you say about S1 and S2? About S1 AND
    NOT(S2)

18
SOURCE "Housing Characteristics 1990",
Residential Energy Consumption Survey, Energy
Information Administration, DOE/EIA-0314(90),
page 54.
19
Statistical Policy Working Paper 22 - Report on
Statistical Disclosure Limitation Methodology'',
Chapter 2, Federal Committee on Statistical
Methodology, May 1994.
Social Security Administration (SSA) rules
prohibit tabulations in which a detail cell is
equal to a marginal total or which would allow
users to determine an individual's age within a
five year interval, earnings within a 1000
interval or benefits within a 50 interval.
20
Statistical Policy Working Paper 22 - Report on
Statistical Disclosure Limitation Methodology'',
Chapter 2, Federal Committee on Statistical
Methodology, May 1994.
21
Statistical Policy Working Paper 22 - Report on
Statistical Disclosure Limitation Methodology'',
Chapter 2, Federal Committee on Statistical
Methodology, May 1994.
22
Statistical Policy Working Paper 22 - Report on
Statistical Disclosure Limitation Methodology'',
Chapter 2, Federal Committee on Statistical
Methodology, May 1994.
23
Statistical Policy Working Paper 22 - Report on
Statistical Disclosure Limitation Methodology'',
Chapter 2, Federal Committee on Statistical
Methodology, May 1994.
24
Statistical Policy Working Paper 22 - Report on
Statistical Disclosure Limitation Methodology'',
Chapter 2, Federal Committee on Statistical
Methodology, May 1994.
25
Swapping microdata records
  • Find similar records
  • Swap some fields
  • Perform averages
  • Have a requirement swap so as to preserve
    averages in all directions

26
Aggregation
  • Putting together records (from different
    databases) that share some attribute values to
    create a composite record.

27
k-anonymity
  • A single record has the same quasi-identifier as
    k-1 others.
  • Attacks
  • Unsorted matching (see Fig. 3 Sweeney)
  • Complementary release (see Fig. 4 and 5 -
    Sweeney)
  • Temporal Attack

28
L. Sweeney. k-anonymity a model for protecting
privacy. International Journal on Uncertainty,
Fuzziness and Knowledge-based Systems, 10 (5),
2002 557-570.
Race Birth Gender ZIP
Problem t1 Black 1965 m 0214
short breath t2 Black 1965 m 0214
chest pain t3 Black 1965 f 0213
hypertension t4 Black 1965 f 0213
hypertension t5 Black 1964 f 0213
obesity t6 Black 1964 f 0213 chest
pain t7 White 1964 m 0213 chest
pain t8 White 1964 m 0213
obesity t9 White 1964 m 0213 short
breath t10 White 1967 m 0213 chest
pain t11 White 1967 m 0213 chest
pain
Example of k-anonymity, where k2 and QIRace,
Birth, Gender, ZIP
29
L. Sweeney. k-anonymity a model for protecting
privacy. International Journal on Uncertainty,
Fuzziness and Knowledge-based Systems, 10 (5),
2002 557-570.
  • Race ZIP Race ZIP Race ZIP
  • Asian 02138 Person 02138 Asian 02130
  • Asian 02139 Person 02139 Asian 02130
  • Asian 02141 Person 02141 Asian 02140
  • Asian 02142 Person 02142 Asian 02140
  • Black 02138 Person 02138 Black 02130
  • Black 02139 Person 02139 Black 02130
  • Black 02141 Person 02141 Black 02140
  • Black 02142 Person 02142 Black 02140
  • White 02138 Person 02138 White 02130
  • White 02139 Person 02139 White 02130
  • White 02141 Person 02141 White 02140
  • White 02142 Person 02142 White 02140

Examples of k-anonymity tables unsorted matching
attack
30
L. Sweeney. k-anonymity a model for protecting
privacy. International Journal on Uncertainty,
Fuzziness and Knowledge-based Systems, 10 (5),
2002 557-570.
Race BirthDate Gender ZIP Problem Race BirthDate
Gender ZIP Problem b 65 M 02141 short of breath b
65 M 02141 short of breath b 65 M 02141 chest
pain b 65 M 02141 chest pain - 65 F 0213
painful eye b 65 F 02138 painful eye - 65 F
0213 wheezing b 65 F 02138 wheezing b 64
F 02138 obesity b 64 F 02138 obesity b 64
F 02138 chest pain b 64 F 02138 chest pain w
64 M 0213 short of breath w 60-69 M 02138 short
of breath - 65 F 0213 hypertension w 60-69 -
02139 hypertension w 64 M 0213 obesity w
60-69 - 02139 obesity w 64 M 0213 fever
w 60-69 - 02139 fever w 67 M 02138 vomiting
w 60-69 M 02138 vomiting w 67 M 02138 back pain
w 60-69 M 02138 back pain
Complementary Release Attack Two k-anonymity
tables k2
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