Training for Safety

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Training for Safety Captain David
Owens AIRBUS
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(No Transcript)
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Dakota DC-3 Rand Airport South Africa 2003
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Iljuschin Il-18 at Moscow airport 2005
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Sud SE-210 Caravelle III - Zurich July 1961
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Continental Airlines Boeing 757-200 August 2005
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Boeing 787
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A380 Maiden Flight
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What has changed?What is the same?
Training!
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Does One Size Fit All?
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IATA Training Qualification Initiative (ITQI)

• IATA Board of Governors has asked IATA to conduct
  a review of airline industry training needs for
  licensed personnel (pilots, mechanics /
  engineers) and develop recommendations for
  meeting these needs with no compromise to safety
  and quality
• December 2007

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Flight Operations Deliverables

• Review the applicability of existing regulations
• Develop global standards and best practices for
• MPL implementation
• Instructor qualification
• FSTD
• Approval criteria for training providers
• Pre-selection criteria for pilots
• Type Rating and Recurrent training
• Transition into Competency based training

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Evidence - Based TrainingMeeting the real
challenges
NO TYPE OR IMAGES CAN TOUCH THE SKY

• Why change?
• What do we mean by evidence?
• How do we manage the process?
• The outcome

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Why we must change.Mandatory Items (JAR-FCL)

• Flight Preparation
• Before take-off checklist
• Engine failure between V1 and V2
• Rejected take-off before reaching V1
• Instrument departure and arrival procedures
• Engine-out Precision Approach to minima
• NDB/VOR/LOC approach to MDA
• Go-Around engine-out
• Landing critical engine inoperative

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And JAR-FCL Mandatory Items

• Engine
• Pressurisation
• Pitot-static
• Fuel
• Electrical
• Hydrualic
• Flight controls
• Anti ice
• Autopilot/flight director
• Stall warning system
• GPWS
• Radio navigation

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• Fire Drills
• Smoke control removal
• Engine failures
• Fuel dumping
• Windshear
• Pressurisation failure
• Incapacitation
• Other emergency procedures
• ACAS event
• Steep turns
• Stalling

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The Airline Burden Crowding of training
requirements

• Existing framework
• Mandatory items licensing and operations
• Low Visibility mandatory items
• Special airport operations
• ETOPS
• RNP?
• Very little scope for effective additional
  training within existing cost structure
• Too much focus on abnormal procedures
• Much more needed in approach landing

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The Problem today .

• By regulation, flight crew training and checking
  is based on events, which may be highly
  improbable in modern aeroplanes.
• Training programmes are consequently saturated
  with items that may not necessarily mitigate the
  real risks or enhance safety in modern air
  transport operations.

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Our objective..we will.

• Develop, evaluate and publish best industry
  practice for the training and checking of flight
  crew in modern air transport operations

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Evidence Based TrainingThe working group
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What do we mean by Evidence?
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2nd jet generation
Includes western built jets Excludes training,
flight test, war, terrorism
1st generation
All aircraft
2nd generation
4th generation
3rd generation
Years Of Operation
Sources Airclaims, Airbus
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Analysis of Flight Data
Max vertical acceleration and vertical speed (at
touchdown)
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Max vertical acceleration and vertical speed (at
touchdown)
A340-300 A340-600
A340-600 has higher number of Hi G landings
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STEADES
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?
Confidential
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How do we manage the process?
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Output
Accidents Incidents Flight Data LOSA
Protocol Gatekeeper Process
General Filtered
General Generation Specific Fleet
Specific Operation Specific
IATA Best Practice
Sort
New TrainingHypothesis
Process Evidence Based Training
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Training Construction By Flight Phase
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Training Analysis By Flight Phase
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B737
A320
MD11
A330
CRJ
B747
A380
A310
etc
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Not all about Data,Data can mislead

• Should we train for the statisticallylikely
  only?
• We can anticipate 95 ofevents
• The BIG problem is sometimes theother 5

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Black Swans

• Data is reactive
• Accidents are difficult to predict
• Pilot behaviour is difficult to predict

When people and complex systems interact, there
will always be an infinite number of possible
outcomes
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The Unforeseen, a classic Black Swan! If we could
anticipate all, failures should be designed out
(Sioux City)
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Our Hypothesis
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Reactive
Proactive
Environment
Environment
Same skills to manage the foreseen and the
unforeseen
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Knowledge Skills Attitudes (KSA)
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The outcome
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Risk of doing nothing

• Complacency with reliable technology
• Devalued and ineffective training programmes
• Difficult designing training programmes
• No impact on Accident rates

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Benefits

• Evidence based programmes adapted by fleet and
  operation
• Greater focus on normal operations
• Greater emphasis on human performance
• Encourage out of the box thinking with
  developed methodologies to manage risk

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OEM Data
? ITQI
ITQI Regulations
Line Operations
Training
Ops Data
New Training Model
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• Accept improvements in design reliability.
• Evolve training away from an inventory based
  approach.
• Train real skills to manage real risks.

New paradigm for training