Title: Alternatingoffers Bargaining problems
1Alternating-offers Bargaining problems A
Co-evolutionary Approach
Department of Computer Science
Nanlin Jin, Professor Edward Tsang, Professor
Abhinay Muthoo, Tim Gosling, Dr Maria Fasli, Dr
Sheri Markose, Guannan Wang http//cswww.essex.ac.
uk/Research/CSP/bargain
- People
- Computer Scientists
- Economists
Basic Alternating-Offers Bargaining
Problem Bargaining theory studies a class of
bargaining situations where two players have
common interests, usually called cake, but
conflict over how the cake is divided.
Under the No delay and Stationarity
assumptions, Perfect Equilibrium Partition
(P.E.P) of the basic Alternating-Offer Bargaining
is
- Technical Overview
- More Realistic Assumptions
-
- Co-evolutionary System
- For the bargaining problem, co-evolution is
required as (a) the fitness is assessed by
bargaining outcomes between strategies from
co-evolving populations and (b) the two players
may have different information. - Observations
- Cake Partitions by Co-Evolution
- In general, co-evolutionary system can find out
approximate solutions with low cost and
reasonable time. Experimental agreements
distribute within the P.E.P neighbourhood.
- Observations
- Co-adaptive Learning
- Strategies modify in beneficial ways to adapt to
dynamic environments through reinforcement
learning. Usually both players behaviours and
bargaining outcomes stabilize near to P.E.P after
a sufficiently long leaning period. - Run time100 runs last for only about 1 or 2 days
- Conclusions
- Strategies do learn to perform better during
co-evolution process.
- Players are allowed to take any division of the
cake, if share xi ?(0, 1 - Players have neither the knowledge of P.E.P nor
the intelligent reasoning ability as economists.
But players have the basic common senses, that
are the higher payoff the better, and the higher
bargaining cost the lower payoff. - One player doesnt know the others behaviours
before bargaining starts - gt bounded rationality
In Biology, co-evolution is defined as reciprocal
evolutionary change in interacting species.
Where XA and XB are the optimal share for A and
B, respectively, ?A and ?B are their discount
factors
Contact For more information, visit
Computational Finance http//cswww.essex.ac.uk/R
esearch/CSP/finance Center for Computation
Finance and Economic Agents (CCFEA)
http//www.cfea-labs.net For possible
collaboration, contact Professor Edward
Tsang Phone 44 1206 872774 email
edward_at_essex.ac.ukNanlin Jin Phone 44 1206
872771 email njin_at_essex.ac.uk
Evolutionary Computation Evolution Computation,
inspired by nature, has been proved successful in
studying adaptive systems. It is especially good
for non-linear, epistatic, large search- space
problems.
- Evolution Process
- A set of candidate solutions is called a
population - Survival of fittest the better performance, the
higher possibility to be selected as parents of
the next generation - Crossover and Mutation modifications used to
generate the next generation.
Funding This research has been partly funded by
BT and University of Essex
In situations when we are unable to compute the
P.E.P., can we evolve sensible bargaining
strategies?