Title: An Improved Correlation Attack on A51
1An Improved Correlation Attack on A5/1
Alexander Maximov Thomas Johansson Lund
University, SWEDEN
Steve Babbage Vodafone Group RD, UK
- Outline
- A5/1 cipher overview
- Previous attack
- Our Improvements
- Results
2The Structure of A5/1
Majority rule
3One Frame Generation
4One Frame Generation
5One Frame Generation
6One Frame Generation
7One Frame Generation
8A Simple Correlation Attack
9A Simple Correlation Attack
10One Information Bit Extraction
1. LFSRs are clocked
at time t101 with probability
2. Random source
Examples ?
11Ekdahl-Johansson Attack (2002)
1. Not only t101 is used to estimate
but t101164
Information from one frame Fnj
Information from all frames j1,2,
Note as
as
12Ekdahl-Johansson Attack (2002)
2. To recover the Key uniquely, 64 bits must be
estimated
- 19 bits from LFSR1
- 22 bits from LFSR2
- 23 bits from LFSR3
Example ?
13Ekdahl-Johansson Attack (2002)
Note some details are omitted
Performance
14Our Approach. First Idea.
For each frame Fn
Consider time t. Assume at time t1 LFSR3 is not
clocked
Recall
15Our Approach. First Idea.
For each frame Fn
Consider time t. Assume at time t1 LFSR3 is not
clocked
1. LFSR1 and LFSR2 are clocked
at time t
AND at time t1 LFSR3 is NOT clocked. The
probability is
2. Random source
Examples ?
16Our Approach. First Idea.
For each frame Fnj
Consider time t. Assume at time t1 LFSR3 is not
clocked
Introduce new random variables for 3 cases
17Our Approach. Second Idea.
For each frame Fnj
Consider d consecutive estimators
jointly
Introduce new d-dimension random variable, and
its estimator
known vector, when
d-dimension random variable,
unknown for the attacker
is given (or guessed)
18Information Extraction
1. From each frame extract the following
probability table
? Example
2. Combine the probability tables from all m
frames
? Example
3. When enough tables are collected (for
different pairs ), perform the
decoding.
19Information Extraction
1. Extracting Information from one frame Fnj
For all possible guesses
calculate
20Information Extraction
2. Combining Information from all frames
21Information Extraction
3. Decoding
h Distribution tables are derived (input)
Decoding purpose (output)
22Up to now
For any pair
we can derive the distribution of d-dimension
random variable of the form
I.e., we know
Note as
as for the real vector of
its probability
23Our Simulation Results
24Our Simulation Results
25Our Simulation Results
26Results in Comparison
27Part III--------------
To be removed before the presentation
- Time planned 5 min
- Actual time
- Try1
- Try2
- Contents
- Problems with Decoding
- Intervals Good and Bad
- Tables Many of them
28Information Extraction
Error pattern
Example, d4 ?
where
29Our Target
Recall To recover the Key uniquely, 64 bits must
be estimated 19 bits from LFSR1, 22
from LFSR2, and 23 from LFSR3.
A Simple Decoding Idea
Collect distributions of
for all
Good 22 bits of LFSR1 and LFSR2 will be decoded
two sequences
and
Bad Decoding is an exhaustive search of size
30Ekdahl-Johansson Attack (2002)
- 3. Use short intervals and decode short
sequences - For decoding, use several intersecting intervals,
of smaller size. - When decoding, find the best r solutions (short
sequences) for each interval independently. - The real sequence is a join of two or more short
sequences. Short sequences intercect each other,
due to interval design.
Questions
Which intervals are good?
How intervals must be designed?
31One Interval 87..97 at Different t
32Different Intervals at Different t
33Our Design of Intervals
34Exhaustive Search of Short Sequences on One
Interval Ia
35Many Tables of Short Sequences
r the number of the most likelihood candidates
for short-sequences
36Part IV--------------
To be removed before the presentation
- Time planned 5 min
- Actual time
- Try1
- Try2
- Contents
- Strategies I, II, and III
- Simulation Results
- Results in Comparison
37Strategy I 9 tables
38Strategy II 6 tables
39Strategy III 4 tables
40Our Simulation Results