DDoS Defense by Offense - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

About This Presentation
Title:

DDoS Defense by Offense

Description:

Fig 3. Server allocation to Good vs. Bad Clients when ... Unfair allocation. Clients with higher bandwidth receive better service. ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:65
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 23
Provided by: cseCu
Category:

less

Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: DDoS Defense by Offense


1
DDoS Defense by Offense
  • Presented by
  • Matthew C.H. Ma
  • Damon Chan

2
Introduction
  • Offense is the best defense?
  • This principle often applies to sports, military
    strategy, etc. Examples
  • Phoenix Suns (Basketball)
  • WWII Germany (Blitzkrieg)
  • Does this apply to Internet?
  • When and how?

3
Motivation
  • Denial-of-Service (DoS, DDoS) attacks cost
    companies billions of dollars each year.
  • Service level must be maintained for
    mission-critical work.
  • Need to protect against such attacks.
  • Aim to provide better service to good clients in
    the event of a DDoS attack.

4
Summary of Paper
  • Presents a method to defend against
    application-level DDoS attacks, through
    counter-attack.
  • Method is called Speak-Up.
  • Describes idea, design, implementation.
  • Prototype, evaluate and analyze effectiveness of
    method in a simulation environment.

5
What is Speak-up?
  • When server is under DDoS attack, encourage all
    clients to send more traffic
  • DEMONSTRATION

6
Why should this Work?
  • Assumption Bad clients already using most of
    their upload bandwidth.
  • All clients encouraged.
  • Bad clients are also encouraged but they are
    unable to send more.
  • Good clients make up larger proportion of total
    traffic.
  • Result Good clients receive better service.

7
Compare with Other Methods (1)
  • Massively Overprovision
  • Provide enough resources to serve both attackers
    and good clients
  • Detect and Block
  • Profile IP addresses.
  • block/limit unauthorized access.
  • Cannot easily handle heterogeneous requests.

8
Compare with Other Methods (2)
  • Currency Based
  • Allow service only after client pays a currency.
  • No need to discriminate, harder requests pay
    more.
  • Speak-Up is a currency based method
  • Currency Bandwidth

9
Applicability (1)
  • Bandwidth
  • Speak-Up helps good clients in proportion to
    their available bandwidth
  • Attackers need more resources to do the same
    damage
  • Protection for Good Clients
  • Possible for good clients to maintain full
    service.
  • Depends on the server's spare capacity
  • (One minus utilization)

10
Applicability (2)
  • Effect on Network
  • More overall traffic does not damage network.
    Additional traffic shares fairly with other
    traffic (congestion control).
  • Only a very small fraction of all servers will be
    under attack at any one time.
  • Conditions
  • Required
  • C1 Adequate link bandwidth
  • C2 Adequate client bandwidth
  • Optional (Speak-Up offers advantage when)
  • C3 No pre-defined clientele
  • C4 Non-human clientele
  • C5 Unequal requests, spoofing, smart bots

11
Design (1)
  • Three Required Mechanisms
  • Limit number of requests to server.
  • Allocation method that reveals the bandwidth.
  • Perform encouragement to clients.
  • Thinner
  • Placed in front of the server to implement the 3
    mechanisms

12
Design (2)
  • Random Drop, Aggressive Retries
  • Separate Payment Channel
  • Give server access to client who has sent the
    most bits through the payment channel.
  • Handling Heterogeneous Requests
  • More realistic case
  • Thinner can break a hard request into equal sized
    chunks.
  • Take an ongoing payment until request completes.

13
Examining the Design
  • Effect on Network
  • Internet core at low utilization.
  • Adequate bandwidth except at bottleneck links.
  • Shared (bottleneck) Links
  • Good Bad clients share same link. Good client
    loses out with/without Speak-Up.
  • Provisioning the Thinner
  • Needs enough bandwidth processing power.
  • Easier than provisioning the server itself (since
    the thinner does less).

14
Thinner Implementation
  • Prototype built using JavaScript
  • When server is not free (under attack)
  • JavaScript tells web client to re-send
  • Actual request
  • HTTP POST containing dummy data (large)
  • Track the amount of dummy data.
  • Payment deducting the amount of data sent.
  • Used to simulate environment to test the theory.

15
Experimental Evaluation (1)
  • Allocation to good clients
  • Speak-up improves service to good clients

Fig 2. Server allocation to Good Clients
16
Experimental Evaluation (2)
  • Comparison with/without speak-up
  • Speak-Up offers advantage when turned on.

Fig 3. Server allocation to Good vs. Bad Clients
when Aggregate Good Client bandwidth 50, 100,
and 200 Mbits/s
17
Experimental Evaluation (3)
  • Payment Time (Latency)
  • Speak-up introduces little latency for clients to
    send extra data through payment channel.

Fig 4. Time needed to make payment
18
Experimental Evaluation (4)
  • Average Payment
  • Good clients pay almost nothing when server is
    not overloaded.

Fig 4. Average Payment Price of served requests
19
Disadvantages
  • Unfair allocation
  • Clients with higher bandwidth receive better
    service.
  • Clients may have to pay for extra bandwidth.
  • Incentives for ISPs to encourage botnets
  • Flash crowds treated like an attack (whenever the
    server is overloaded).

20
Conclusion
  • Speak-up offers a special brand of protection
    against DDoS attacks.
  • Based on the design and analysis of the
    prototype, speak-up seems to be a practical
    design
  • But still at a very early stage, needs much
    future work and investigation.
  • Needs a market survey
  • Will ISPs be willing to implement this as a
    service?
  • Who needs it?

21
Our Opinion of Speak-Up What We Like
  • Achieves Aim.
  • improves service level of good clients during
    attack
  • Concept is elegant.
  • Simple idea Exploits weakness of attackers.
  • Effect/Cost on the network seems to be
    acceptable.
  • Get more out of spare server utilization.

22
Our Opinion of Speak-Up What We Dont Like
  • Effect of low-rate attack not addressed
  • Bad client also has spare bandwidth.
  • Aggressive retries could make things worse in the
    event of severe network failures
  • Assumptions hold because of nature of current
    network characteristics
  • How to detect when these assumptions break?
  • Switch off speak-up (automatically?) under these
    conditions.
  • Effect of various traffic patterns? (i.e.
    heavy-tail distribution)
Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
About PowerShow.com