Public Policy for Engineers

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Eng. 298A 017 Eng. 198 003
Public Policy for Engineers Lecture 4 Beyond
Patents
Stephen M. Maurer Goldman School of Public
Policy smaurer_at_berkeley.edu
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Other
Choices
Prizes
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Other
Choices
Prizes

• Ex Post Efficiency
• No Deadweight Loss!!
• Assumes taxation is efficient
• Ex Ante Efficiency Innovation
• You Must Know v!!

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Other
Choices
Prizes
3. Eliciting Privately Held Information Directed
Prizes (DARPA, X-Prize) Blue Sky Prizes
(Google) 4. Agency Problems Sponsors Types
of Prizes Commitment Strategies 5. Agency
Problems Researchers
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Other
Choices
Contracts
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Other
Choices
Contracts

• Ex Post Efficiency
• No Deadweight Loss!!
• Ex Ante Efficiency Innovation
• You Must Know (v - c)!!
• Minimizing c Competition, Sealed Bids
• Auctions.
• 3. Eliciting Privately Held Information

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Other
Choices
Contracts
4. Agency Problems Sponsors Periodic
Payments, Litigation 5. Agency Problems
Researchers Cheating, Buying Power Repeat
Business
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Other
Choices
Contracts
Patent Buyouts
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Other
Choices
Grants
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Other
Choices
Grants

• Ex Post Efficiency
• No Deadweight Loss!!
• Ex Ante Efficiency Innovation
• You Know c Before, v Afterward!!
• 3. Eliciting Privately Held Information

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Other
Choices
Grants
4. Agency Problems Sponsors 5. Agency Problems
Researchers An Imperfect Solution . . .
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(No Transcript)
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Other
Choices
Policy (Pt. 1) Does the World Need Database
Protection?
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Application
Databases
History A Database History of the
Universe Recent U.S. Legal History Feist
Congress Europe (1996) U.S. Politics IP as a
Hidden Tax Users vs. Sellers
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Application
Databases
Policy The Paradox Why Do We Have a Database
Industry at All? The Issue DWL vs. More
innovation The Evidence Whos Been
Injured? What New Databases Would We Get? The
European Experiment
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Application
Databases

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Application
Databases
Advice to Congress Options Property
Rules Liability Rules Misappropriation The
INS Case Current Law Prove It!
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Open Source A New (and Different) Way to
Organize Innovation
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Overview
Introduction History Definitions Incentives S
tability What is the Role of Licenses
Leaders? Proprietary Code Coexistence or
Conflict? Limits to Open Source? Extensions
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Introduction
The Dilbert Paradigm The Open Source
Enigma Linux, Apache, etc. What Makes People
Do It? Weird Explanations The Gift
Economy, Craftsmanship and The Flow State.
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History Definitions
History
Antecedents Folklore (e.g., The Odyssey) User
Innovation (Machine Tools, Sporting
Gear) Defensive Publishing Using Patents to
Regulate Technologies and Keep Them
Public Patenting Fission (Fermi, Szilard),
Deuterium (Urey) Plutonium (Seaborg).
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History Definitions
History
Immediate Origins Academic Incentives Reputati
on Signaling Own-Use Self-Satisfaction Ide
ology Efficiency (Sharing Information) ATT/UN
IX Appropriability Complements
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History Definitions
Definitions
Definitions Right to See Source Code Right
to Copy Right to Modify Use Richard
Stallman (Free Software) Is Open Source a
Moral Principle? cf. Moral Rights The Viral
Principle General Public License (GPL) Open
Software Berkeley UNIX License Lesser GPL
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Incentives
Review
Investment Based on Price Signal
Avoids Moral Risk Sponsors
Avoids Moral Risk Researchers
Avoids Undersupply
Elicits Private Information
v
v
v
v
Patents
Contract
v
v
Research
?
?
?
?
?
Open
Source
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Incentives
General
Many Different OSS Incentives Own-Use Signalin
g Education Complements Strategic
Goals Social Psychology Different Incentives
Welfare Implications for Each!
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Incentives
Own Use
Incentive No. 1 Own-Use by Corporations and
Hobbyists
Avoids Moral Risk Sponsors
Investment Based on Consumer Need
Avoids Moral Risk Researchers
Elicits Private Information
Avoids Undersupply
?
?
?
?
?
Open
Source
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Incentives
Own Use
Investment Based on Consumer Need First Answer
OSS Delivers (v c)indiv Patents Deliver (?
v c)society.
.
Investment Based on Consumer Need
Avoids Undersupply
Avoids Moral Risk Sponsors
Avoids Moral Risk Researchers
Elicits Private Information
?
?
?
?
?
Open
Source
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Incentives
Own Use
Investment Based on Price Signal Comments Cost
may be smaller than even one individuals
(v). OSS takes advantage of individuals with
unusual (v), (c). Own-Use by Oligopolists helps
aggregate demand (v). Explains bias toward
developer products. Doing some OSS projects is
better than doing none.
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Incentives
Own Use
Second Answer Game Theory Monolithic
Software Delay (Game of Chicken, Mixed
Strategy) Duplicated Work (v c) for entire
project Modular Software Less
Delay Duplicated Work (v c) for every
module Extended Models Individualized
Software The Jukebox Model Economies of Scale
vs.Competitive Advantage Finite Lifetimes
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Incentives
Own Use
Elicits Private Information if (v c)indiv
gt 0 (Open Source) (? v c)society
gt 0 (Patents) But Coordination
Problems in both cases!
.
Investment Based on Consumer Need
Avoids Undersupply
Avoids Moral Risk Sponsors
Avoids Moral Risk Researchers
Elicits Private Information
?
?
?
?
v
Open
Source
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Incentives
Own Use
Agency Problems Researcher Sponsor! Cf.
Contracts Reporting Bugs, Programmer Skill
Investment Based on Consumer Need
Avoids Undersupply
Avoids Moral Risk Sponsors
Avoids Moral Risk Researchers
Elicits Private Information
?
?
?
v
v
Open
Source
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Incentives
Own Use
Avoids Undersupply No DWL!
Investment Based on Consumer Need
Avoids Undersupply
Avoids Moral Risk Sponsors
Avoids Moral Risk Researchers
Elicits Private Information
v
v
v
v
v
Open
Source
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Incentives
Signaling
Signaling Benefits For Individuals. Jobs,
Stock, Venture Capital Offers For Companies
Signaling Quality Assumes OSS Can Measure
Programmer Talent Better Open Code
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Incentives
Signaling
Investment Based on Consumer Need
Demonstrating Software Ability Is Only Weakly
Connected to Consumer Need. Skews products
toward developers system administrators
Investment Based on Consumer Need
Avoids Undersupply
Avoids Moral Risk Sponsors
Avoids Moral Risk Researchers
Elicits Private Information
?
?
?
?
Open
Source
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Incentives
Signaling
Elicits Private Information?
Demonstrating Software Ability Is Only Weakly
Connected to Providing Information.
Avoids Undersupply
Avoids Moral Risk Sponsors
Investment Based on Price Signal
Avoids Moral Risk Researchers
Elicits Private Information
?
?
?
Open
Source
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Incentives
Signaling
Agency Problems Incentive to Steal Credit The
Threshold Effect Is OSS More Transparent than
Corporate Life? Do Strong Programmers Self-Select?
Avoids Undersupply
Avoids Moral Risk Sponsors
Investment Based on Price Signal
Avoids Moral Risk Researchers
Elicits Private Information
?
v
Open
Source
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Incentives
Signaling
Avoids Undersupply
No DWL!
Avoids Undersupply
Avoids Moral Risk Sponsors
Investment Based on Price Signal
Avoids Moral Risk Researchers
Elicits Private Information
v
v
Open
Source
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Incentives
Education
Similar to Signaling But No Agency
Problems Does OSS Peer Review Facilitate
Education?
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Incentives
Complements
Selling Complements Complements Can Include
Hardware, Applications, Marketing, Customization
Services, Education Tech Support Monopolists
Complete Appropriability Low-Cost Complements
Boost Revenue For Non-Monopolists Limited
Appropriability
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Incentives
Complements
Implements a Pseudo-Patent System OSS
Delivers (? v c)society Patents Deliver (?
v c)society
.
.
Embedded LINUX Partial appropriability, more
spillovers than normal patent incentives.
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Incentives
Strategic
Goals
Standard Setting Influencing OSS
Evolution Market Penetration Alumni
Effect Reassuring Consumers Hold-up Obsolesc
ence Switching Costs Preserving Option Value of
OSS
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Incentives
Social
Psychology
Social Psychology Explanations Obligation,
Community Identification, Reputation, Ideology,
Altruism. Mechanics Re-label c as net
cost. Agency Problems Voluntarism
Markets Red Cross Blood Donations
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Incentives
Social
Psychology
Fragility Fear of Exploitation Transparency and
Procedural Fairness Incentives are Weak But
Altruism in Games Small Rewards Can be
Important
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Fixing Market Failures
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Fixing Market Failures
1) IP Doesnt Work Perfectly Reliance on
Compiled Code Bug reporting, re-use, ability
to judge quality. Other Secrecy Costs Licensing
and enforcement costs. 2) Determining Programmer
Quality Closed Code Makes It Hard to Judge
Quality Peer Review Makes Process More
Transparent OSS offers a more accurate wage Can
Commercial Firms Use OSS Rankings? 3)
Determining Program Quality
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Fixing Market Failures
4) Determining User Needs Inherent Difficulty
of Communicating Software Needs OSS and Price
Discrimination
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Why Licenses?
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Stability
Why Licenses? Welfare and Consumer
Sovereignty Possible Explanations Protects
Signaling/Reputation Incentives Berkeley UNIX,
not GPL Social Psychology Incentives and the
Non-Distribution Constraint Liability Discour
aging Defectors
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Stability
Why Leadership? Certifying Quality Forking,
Hijacking and Trust
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Proprietary Code Coexistence or Conflict?
Segregated Markets? Customized Software Mass
Market Software Competition Proprietary Code
Must Be Higher Quality Redefining
quality User friendliness, documentation,
support, backward compatibility. Installatio
n Costs Welfare Effects Constraints on
Proprietary Pricing Enforcing V C? Improved
Labor Markets
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Limits to Open Source?
Does OSS Organize Some Tasks Better Than
Others? Building Core Code vs. Adding
Code vs. Fixes vs. Bug Reports Is OSS
limited by quality assurance? Is Modularity a
Free Parameter?
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Limits to Open Source?
Many Projects are OSS in Name Only For every
successful OSS project, there are thousands of
unsuccessful ones. 80 of Projects have lt 2
developers. 1 of Projects have gt 16
developers. 80 of Projects show no activity.
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Beyond Open Source?
Complex Inventions GIS Drug Discovery