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Segregation in Social Networks

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Title: Segregation in Social Networks


1
Segregation in Social Networks
  • Giorgio Fagiolo
  • University of Verona, Italy
  • https//mail.sssup.it/fagiolo
  • Marco Valente
  • University of LAquila, Italy
  • Nick Vriend
  • Queen Mary, University of London, U.K.

WEHIA 2005 10th Annual Workshop on Economics with
Heterogeneous Interacting Agents Colchester, June
2005
2
Background Literature (1/2)
  • Schelling Model of Neighborhood Segregation
    (1978)
  • Two types of agents placed on a lattice
  • Agents care about the composition of their
    neighborhood
  • Agents are unhappy only if more than 50 of
    neighbors is of different type
  • If unhappy, they move to a satisfactory (empty)
    position
  • Micro-Motives vs. Macro-Behaviors
  • Despite no agent strictly prefers segregation, a
    strongly segregated society always emerges
  • Very simple model explaining self-organized,
    emergent macro property out of repeated
    interactions among individual agents
  • Empirical implications segregation emerging in
    racial, social and natural contexts

3
Background Literature (2/2)
  • Robustness of Schellings Results
  • Pancs and Vriend (2003)
  • Checking Schelling Results vs. Simplifying
    Assumptions
  • Utilities Schellings agents are equally happy
    to live in a completely integrated city or in a
    completely segregated city of like agents
  • Lattice dimension and metrics (1D vs. 2D),
    percentage of empty nodes, segregation measures,
    inertia, sequential vs. simultaneous moves
  • Pancs and Vriend (2003) Main Results
  • Schelling Segregation Model very robust to a
    whole range of variations in its setup
  • Even in all individuals strictly prefer to live
    in a fully integrated city, segregation will
    occur in the aggregate!

4
Motivations (1/2)
  • What happens when agents are not spatially
    located?
  • Schelling (1978) and Pancs and Vriend (2003)
  • Agents spatially located on lattices (proxy of
    geographic space)
  • They care about their local neighbors (proxy of
    actual neighborhoods)

5
Motivations (2/2)
  • From lattices to generic networks
  • Studying Schelling Model with agents located on
    generic networks

6
Motivations (2/2)
  • From lattices to generic networks
  • Studying Schelling Model with agents located on
    generic networks
  • Theoretical motivation
  • Topological structure of neighborhoods is regular
    and homogeneous
  • Lattice only as a special type of network
  • Results can also be affected by lattice
    homogeneity properties
  • Empirical motivation
  • People also interact through networks of friends,
    relatives, and colleagues, and through virtual
    communities on the internet
  • Segregation may not necessarily occur at the
    spatial (neighborhood) level only
  • People might be socially segregated despite they
    are spatially integrated

7
The Model (1/2)
  • Locations and Players
  • M nodes
  • ? percentage of empty nodes
  • N(1-?)M agents
  • Agents can be of two types -1,1
  • Networks
  • Non-directed graph with M ? M (symmetric)
    socio-matrix Wwhk
  • Interaction Group of node k V(k) h
    whkwkh1
  • Utilities
  • Standard Schellings type of utility
  • Agents want at most 50 unlike agents in their
    interaction groups
  • Happy agents get u1
  • Unhappy agents get u0

8
The Model (2/2)
  • Initial conditions
  • Time t0 Choose
  • A particular network instance Wwhk
  • A random allocation of empty nodes and N
    agents/types across nodes
  • Dynamics Locally-constrained moves plus inertia
  • At any t Draw at random one agent
  • If the agent is
  • Happy (u1) then
  • Nothing changes
  • Unhappy (u0) then
  • Searches for empty nodes within his interaction
    group
  • Computes utility if he moves there
  • Moves to a node randomly-chosen among all empty
    nodes providing u1

9
Network Classes
  • 2-D Von Neumann lattice without boundaries
    (torus)
  • Degree of each location D(r) 2r(r1), r
    interaction radius
  • 2-D Moore lattice without boundaries (torus)
  • Degree of each location D(r) 4r(r1), r
    interaction radius

10
Network Classes
  • 2-D Von Neumann lattice without boundaries
    (torus)
  • Degree of each location D(r) 2r(r1), r
    interaction radius
  • 2-D Moore lattice without boundaries (torus)
  • Degree of each location D(r) 4r(r1), r
    interaction radius
  • D-Regular Graphs
  • Each location has the same degree D
  • Random Graphs
  • Each link is in place with probability p
    (independently of other links)
  • Small-World Graphs
  • Based on a 2-D VN lattice with rewiring
    probability ?
  • Scale-Free Graphs
  • Based on M0 initial nodes each holding 4 links

11
Segregation Measures
  • Freemans Network Segregation Index (FSI)
  • Based on Freeman (1972, 1978)
  • Rationale If a given attribute (type) does not
    matter for social relationships (links), then
    relationships (links) should be distributed
    randomly with respect to that attribute
  • Formally
  • (Cross-Group Links Expected by Chance) -
    (Actual Cross-Group Links)
  • --------------------------------------------------
    -------------------------------------------------
  • (Cross-Group Links Expected by Chance)
  • Additional Segregation Indices
  • As in Pancs and Vriend (2003)

12
Simulation Strategy
  • Monte-Carlo Exercises
  • Fix percentage of empty nodes ?
  • Fix network class and parameters, e.g. (average)
    degree
  • Run the model and collect (steady-states or
    long-run) statistics (FSI)
  • Repeat K1000 times and study Monte-Carlo
    distributions
  • Monte-Carlo average of FSI
  • Basic questions
  • Do segregation levels differ among different
    classes of social networks?
  • Comparing different networks with the same
    (average) degree and of empty
    nodes
  • What happens to segregation in each given network
    class when parameters change (degree, of empty
    nodes, graph-specific parameters)?

13
Some Preliminary Results (1/3)
  • Monte-Carlo Average of FSI vs. Networks
  • Percentage of empty nodes ?0.3
  • Comparing D4 vs. D8

D4
D8
14
Some Preliminary Results (2/3)
  • How Large are FSI Values?
  • Comparing Monte-Carlo Distributions vs. Random
    Network-Types Allocations
  • System always attains segregation levels much
    larger than random averages
  • Long-run FSI (kernel-smoothed) densities always
    right of random ones

MOORE (8)
REGULAR (8)
15
Some Preliminary Results (3/3)
  • How Do Resulting Networks Look Like?
  • Plotting steady-state network by arranging nodes
    on a virtual circle
  • REGULAR(8) graph segregation patterns emerge
    also visually
  • Type-x agents close to each other, with links to
    other type-x agents

16
so far
  • Schelling results are quite robust to non-lattice
    networks
  • A society where agents do not live on spatially
    homogeneous environments (lattices) is still
    characterized by high levels of social
    segregation
  • Segregation levels do not dramatically change
    across structurally-different classes of networks
  • If any, segregation is weaker in social networks
    where a few agents hold very crowded interaction
    groups, while the majority holds small
    interaction groups (scale-free)
  • What happens across different parameter setups?
  • Varying the average degree (D) of the network
  • Varying the percentage of empty (available) nodes
    (?)
  • Varying network-specific parameters (rewiring
    probability, etc.)

17
Monte-Carlo Analysis (1/4)
  • Average FSI vs. (Average) Degree Regular vs.
    Random Nets

Small of Empty Nodes
Large of Empty Nodes
  • Small D Similar segregation levels across
    regular vs. random networks
  • Large D Lattices tend to reach slightly higher
    segregation levels
  • Segregation tend to decrease with D in all
    network setups (for large ?)

18
Monte-Carlo Analysis (2/4)
  • Average FSI vs. (Average) Degree Small Worlds

Small of Empty Nodes
Large of Empty Nodes
  • Small-Worlds behave similarly to lattices and
    random graphs
  • Small ? Lattice Large ? Random Graph
  • Weaker segregation as degree increases

19
Monte-Carlo Analysis (3/4)
  • Average FSI vs. (Average) Degree Scale-Free

Small of Empty Nodes
Large of Empty Nodes
  • Segregation is slightly weaker in scale-free
    networks
  • Due to presence of hubs?

20
Monte-Carlo Analysis (4/4)
  • Average FSI vs. Empty Nodes within each network
    class

Regular Graphs
  • Segregation levels are increasing in the of
    empty nodes for any given (average) degree

21
Extensions
  • Dropping inertia
  • Agents always randomize among all available empty
    nodes providing highest utility
  • Dropping local search (no moving costs)
  • Agents care about their local interaction group
    V(i)
  • When they search around, they can do it globally
  • Check all empty nodes in the network and possibly
    move there
  • Introducing endogenous networks
  • Agents placed in a social network
  • Agents can choose where to move in social
    networks
  • But they can also endogenously add/delete social
    links

22
Extensions (1/3)
  • Dropping inertia
  • Agents always randomize among all available empty
    nodes providing highest utility

2D-VN
2D-MOORE
23
Extensions (1/3)
  • Dropping inertia
  • Agents always randomize among all available empty
    nodes providing highest utility

REGULAR
RANDOM
24
Extensions (1/3)
  • Dropping inertia
  • Agents always randomize among all available empty
    nodes providing highest utility

SMALL-WORLDS
SCALE-FREE
25
Extensions (2/3)
  • Dropping local search (no moving costs)
  • Agents care about their local interaction group
    V(i)
  • When they search around, they can do it globally
  • Check all empty nodes in the network and possibly
    move there

2D-VN
2D-MOORE
26
Extensions (2/3)
  • Dropping local search (no moving costs)
  • Agents care about their local interaction group
    V(i)
  • When they search around, they can do it globally
  • Check all empty nodes in the network and possibly
    move there

REGULAR
RANDOM
27
Extensions (2/3)
  • Dropping local search (no moving costs)
  • Agents care about their local interaction group
    V(i)
  • When they search around, they can do it globally
  • Check all empty nodes in the network and possibly
    move there

SMALL-WORLDS
SCALE-FREE
28
Extensions (3/3)
  • Introducing endogenous networks
  • Agents placed in a social network
  • Agents can choose where to move in social
    networks
  • But they can also endogenously add/delete social
    links

29
Conclusions
  • Schelling Model Revisited
  • Pancs and Vriend (2003) Lattice-based
    segregation model
  • Schellings main result about segregation
    emergence holds even when agents have a strict
    preference for complete integration
  • This Paper Segregation in Social Networks
  • Study what happens when agents are located on the
    nodes of generic networks instead of homogeneous
    spatial structures (lattices)
  • Exploring different classes of alternative
    network structures (regular, random,
    small-worlds, scale-free)
  • Main Results
  • High levels of segregation still occur no matter
    network structures
  • Segregation decreases with average degree
    (network density) and with of occupied nodes
    (network crowdedness)
  • Scale-free networks display less segregation,
    lattices display more
  • Removing inertia/local moves implies higher
    segregation levels
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