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Establishing Integrity Operating Windows (IOW

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Title: Establishing Integrity Operating Windows (IOW


1
Establishing Integrity Operating Windows
(IOWs)IPEIA ConferenceFebruary 2, 2006Banff,
Alberta
  • John Reynolds
  • Steamboat Springs, CO, USA
  • Recently retired from
  • Shell Global Solutions (US) Inc.

2
Outline for this Presentation
  • The 10 Shell (US) Process Safety Initiatives
    (PSI)
  • The Pressure Equipment Integrity (PEI) Initiative
  • Corrosion Control Documents (CCD)
  • Integrity Operating Windows (IOW)
  • Standard and Critical IOWs
  • Integration of IOWs into the 10 PSIs
  • Training of Operators on IOWs
  • The Pressure Equipment Integrity Pyramid

3
Ten Process Safety Initiatives (PSI) Initiated
in May, 2000
  • Pressure Equipment Integrity (PEI) - IOW creation
    process
  • Ensure Safe Production (ESP) - IOW monitoring
    process
  • Operator Training and Procedures - IOW knowledge
    transfer
  • Management Of Change (MOC) - IOW change process
  • Investigations 3 Levels up to RCA
  • Protective Instrument Systems (IPF SIL)
  • Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM)
  • Causal Learning
  • Audits and Assessments
  • Process Hazards Analysis (PHA)

4
Process Safety Initiative Metrics
  • Each of the 10 PSIs were required to have four
    main metrics to track implementation progress (10
    X 4 40 metrics total)
  • For the PEI process safety initiative we tracked
  • Numbers of Corrosion Control Documents (CCDs)
    completed
  • Numbers of process units with RBI completed
  • Numbers of process units with all IOWs
    implemented
  • Numbers of operators trained on their CCD IOWs
  • But there was only one bottom line metric for the
    aggregate of the ten process safety initiatives
    gt numbers of process safety incidents per year

5
Results of the Process Safety Initiatives
Numbers of Process Safety Incidents in last 6
years A real success story
6
Primary Aspects of the Pressure Equipment
Integrity (PEI) Initiative
  • Identify all necessary Integrity Operating
    Windows (IOWs)
  • Create OEMI Teams (Operations - Engineering -
    Maintenance - Inspection) in each operating area
    to create and manage CCDs and IOWs
  • Create Corrosion Control Documents (CCDs), which
    document all process IOWs
  • Train operators on the CCD and IOWs
  • Implement IOWs and Risk-Based Inspection (RBI)
  • Implement PEI Focused Asset Integrity Reviews
    (FAIR) to monitor progress of the PEI Initiative

7
ESP
PEI PSI Pyramid
RBI
CCDs IOWs
OEMI Teams
101 Essential Elements
8
Corrosion Control Documents Contents
  • Relatively comprehensive documents for managing
    equipment degradation
  • Description of the process unit and process
    conditions
  • Shutdown and start up conditions that may affect
    corrosion and degradation mechanisms, as well as
    normal operation
  • Process Flow Diagram (PFD) and Materials and
    Corrosion Diagram (modified PFD showing
    construction materials)
  • Corrosion Control Loops (areas of similar
    corrosion within the PFD) e.g. overhead system,
    slurry system, reflux system, etc.
  • All potential types of degradation (and fouling)
    in each process unit and history of problem areas
  • Quantitative and predictive models for
    degradation mechanisms
  • Vital corrosion control procedures, injections,
    inhibitors, etc.
  • Recommended inspection corrosion monitoring,
    process changes, construction materials changes,
    etc.
  • Integrity Operating Windows (IOWs)

9
Corrosion Control Documents Construction
  • Unit specific CCDs completed by an OEMI team
    which includes
  • Site corrosion engineer/specialist
  • Unit process engineer
  • Unit inspector
  • One or more experienced unit operations
    representatives
  • Facilitator (knowledgeable / experienced
    corrosion engineer)
  • Final document represents an agreement between
    the OEMI Team involved and clearly benefits by
    the synergistic interaction of all team members

10
Establishing Integrity Operating Windows
  • Historical operating, maintenance inspection
    records
  • Design data lab data operating data
  • Metallurgical and corrosion data and modules
  • Process chemistry and engineering knowledge
  • Reactive chemistry knowledge
  • Recommended practices (industry and company)
  • Process and corrosion modeling tools
  • Subject matter expertise and experience (heavy
    dose)
  • Result Reasonable, practical IOWs not too
    conservative not non-conservative

11
Integrity Operating Windows
12
Integrity Operating Windows Examples
  • Typically fall into 2 categories
  • Physical
  • Various limits on pressures and temperatures,
    including design, operating, partial pressures,
    dew points, dry points, heating and cooling
    rates, delta P, etc.
  • Flow rates, injection rates, inhibitor dosage,
    amperage levels on Alky contactor motors, slurry
    content, hydrogen flux, vibration limits,
    corrosivity probes, etc.
  • Chemical
  • pH, water content, acid gas loading, sulfur
    content, salt content in crude, NH4HS content,
    NH3 content, TAN, acid strength, amine strength,
    inhibitor concentration, chloride contamination
    levels, oxygen content, etc.

13
IOW Example Hot Hydrogen Service
  • Mechanical design window set by the design code
    e.g. ASME
  • IOW set by material limit for high temperature
    hydrogen attack in API RP 941
  • SOR process temperature definitely within the IOW
  • EOR process temperature possibly beyond the IOW
    need to know the hydrogen partial pressure and
    duration of EOR conditions

Temperature
Mechanical Design Limits

EOR Process Temp
IOW
SOR Process Temp
Pressure
Based on H2 pp
Based on Total Pressure
14
Integrity Operating Windows Typical Numbers
per Operating Unit(before after an intensive
review)
  • Typically start with 5 -10 IOWs that may already
    be in place, along with other operating quality
    variable limits
  • Typically end up with 30 50 IOWs with about
  • 5 -10 being critical limits (requires drastic
    and/or immediate action), and the rest being
    standard limits (requires attention within a
    specified timeframe to get back into control)

15
Definitions IOW Critical Limit
  • A limit at which the operator has one last
    opportunity to return the process to a safe
    condition and, if exceeded, could result in one
    of the following in a fairly short timeframe
  • A Catastrophic Release of Hydrocarbons or
    Hazardous fluids
  • Loss of Containment
  • Non-orderly Shutdown
  • Significant Environmental Impact
  • Other Unacceptable Risk

16
Critical IOW Limit Examples
  • Boiler Feed Water Level
  • Lost of boiler feed water level could quickly
    cause boiler tube rupture
  • Hydroprocess Reactor Temperature
  • Metal temperatures below the MDMT could give rise
    to brittle fracture
  • Heater Tube Skin Temperature
  • Tube could rupture quickly if overheated, caused,
    for example, by a no flow or hot spot condition.
  • Sulfuric Acid Strength in Alkylation
  • Too low acid strength could cause runaway
    reaction

17
Definition Standard Level
  • A limit that, if exceeded over a defined
    period of time, could cause one of the following
    to eventually occur
  • A catastrophic release of hydrocarbons or
    hazardous fluids
  • Loss of containment
  • Non-orderly shutdown
  • A negative impact to the long term unit
    performance and its ability to meet turnaround
    run length
  • Excessive financial impact

18
Standard Level Examples
  • REAC NH4HS Concentration
  • Corrosion of the air cooler and downstream piping
  • Heater Tube Skin Temperature
  • Metallurgical creep could lead to eventual tube
    failure.
  • Crude Fractionator Dew Point Temperature
  • Sustained operation below dew point could cause
    damage to fractionator internals or potential
    loss of containment.
  • pH of Crude Tower Overhead
  • Sustained operation below standard pH level could
    lead to corrosion of tubing and piping and
    potential loss of containment.
  • Desalter Outlet Salt Content
  • Sustained operation above standard level could
    lead to corrosion and potential loss of
    containment

19
Integrity Operating Windows Successes
  • In the CCD review, one IOW team noticed that a
    previous project had installed the wrong
    construction materials immediate inspection
    revealed significant HTHA damage
  • An operator on the team disagreed with the unit
    process engineer and said that we actually
    operate much hotter than you think because we use
    the by-pass immediate inspection revealed
    significant localized damage
  • A corrosion engineer questioned the higher level
    of NH4HS in the REAC system of an HCU immediate
    inspection revealed a previously-missed localized
    spot of significant corrosion
  • An IOW was set on NH4HS concentration at another
    refinery, which then began to take routine lab
    samples soon thereafter discovered the
    concentration was too high and took steps to
    increase wash water and adjust feedstock

20
Operator Training on CCDs and IOWs
  • Level 1
  • Awareness and Overview of the PEI Process Safety
    Initiative
  • SSA Video / CCD / RBI / OEMI / Operator Training
  • Level 2
  • Introduction to Corrosion Control Documents
  • What they contain where theyre stored how to
    use them
  • Level 3
  • Details contained within each operators
    unit-specific CCD
  • Specific IOWs and the reasoning behind them
  • What can happen if the IOW is exceeded

21
ESP
PEI PSI Pyramid
RBI
CCDs IOWs
OEMI TEAMS
101 Essential Elements
22
Implementing Risk-Based Inspection (RBI)
  • Another major part of our pressure equipment
    integrity process safety initiative
  • We use both a Shell developed more qualitative
    RBI (S-RBI), as well as the more quantitative API
    RBI, both successfully for different needs at
    different sites
  • But RBI will not be covered today a topic for
    another day, if you like
  • Suffice it to say that any inspection program, be
    it risk-based, condition-based, or time-based may
    not be fully reliable without effective
    identification and implementation of integrity
    operating windows (IOWs)

23
Integration of CCDs, IOWs RBI
Feedback
Confidence in plant integrity
  • Creating the CCD
  • Type of degradation
  • Location of degradation
  • Susceptibility to degradation
  • Degradation rates
  • IOW limits
  • Determination management of the operating
    limits to avoid degradation

RBI planning Method of inspection Where to
inspect Frequency of inspection
24
Integration of Multiple Work Processes Leading To
Sustained Asset Integrity
Long Term Asset Integrity
Focused Asset Integrity Reviews
Design and Materials Selection
Corrosion Control IOWs
Risk-Based Inspection
Asset integrity management is a balancing process
designed to achieve lowest total cost of
ownership
25
Along with Asset Integrity Comes Proven Better
Process Safety Performance
Numbers of Process Safety Incidents in last 6
years in Shell (US) Refining Operations Facts,
not just hopes for the future
26
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27
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28
Shell Experience with Integrity Operating Windows
(IOWs)Time for Discussion
  • John.Reynolds_at_shell.com
  • Recently retired from
  • Shell Global Solutions (US) Inc.
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