1

• If you know the enemy and know yourself, you
  need not fear the result of a hundred battles.
• - Sun Tzu

2
MIDDLE EAST OVERVIEW

• 18 October 02
• 1LT Falk

3
PURPOSE

• Provide Support Squadron Officers a current
  situational overview covering the Mid-East
  Theater of Operations

4
ENDSTATE

• They suck
• Iraq in poor state to conduct viable defense or
• enough forces
• dont have logistics (hetts to move armored
  forces)
• most forces at 50 OR Rate
• expect 40 surrender on regular divisions
• could conduct Mount operations (urban warfare)
  but not counterattacks (Black Hawk Down)
• Exceptions Republican Guard hand selected with
  political allegiance to Saddam
• Challenge in Logistics Supply from lessons
  learned
• Fundamental understanding of terrain
• Basic understanding of Iraqi Forces (can role
  into they suck)
• LOCs / CHEM (Decon)
• Many challenges

5
AGENDA

• AO / AI
• Weather/Terrain
• Iraq
• Friendly Forces
• Lessons Learned

6
REFERENCES

• National Geographic
• Central Intelligence Agency
• CNN
• Janes
• US News World Report
• Sun Tzu The Art of War
• Moving Mountains Lessons in Leadership and
  Logistics from the Gulf War

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AO / AI
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CONFLICT
10
RELIGION
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OIL AND WATER
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OIL RESERVES
13
Climate

• Mostly desert
• Mild to cool winters
• Dry, hot, cloudless summers
• northernmost regions along Iranian and Turkish
  borders experience cold winters with occasionally
  heavy snows

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CLIMATE
Mean Annual Precipitation

• Baghdad (January)
• Max 16o C / 60o F
• Min 4o C / 39o F

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GEOGRAPHY(IRAQ)

• Area slightly more than twice the size of Idaho
• Land boundaries 3,617 km (168,751 square miles)
• Iran 1,458 km, Jordan 175 km, Kuwait 240 km,
  Saudi Arabia 808 km, Syria 605 km, Turkey 331 km
• Coastline 58 km (36 miles)
• Natural hazards
• dust storms, sandstorms, floods
• Geographical note
• strategic location on Shatt al Arab waterway and
  at the head of the Persian Gulf

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TERRAIN

• Rivers/Lakes
• Cities
• Roads
• LOCs (HWY/ RAIL/AIR)
• Avenues of Approach
• Water/Dams
• Pysch. Points

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LINES OF COMMUNICATION
Syria
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IRAQI PEOPLE

• Population Approximately 21 million
• Key Cities
• Baghdad 5,500,000
• Mosul 1,200,000
• Tikrit 958,372
• Basrah 1,500,000
• 18 Provinces ( 3 Kurdish)
• 75-80 Arab,
• 15-20 Kurdish
• Official Language Arabic
• Religion 97 Muslim
• - 60-65 Shia, 32-37 Sunni, 3 Christian

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• Let me say, frankly, that Suddam Hussein has
  few friends in the Middle East. In the Past, as
  is well known, he has pursued an aggressive
  regional policy that posed a direct threat to
  many Arab countries, as well as to others.
  However, the view among most Arabs is that Iraq
  does not pose a serious threat - or at least an
  immediate military threat...but Suddams main
  threat is to his own people
• - Leading Arab Diplomat

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IRAQI FORCES

• Current status - Poor
• Array of the Corps
• Order of Battle
• No Fly Zones/Air Superiority
• NBC Threat
• Iraq Military

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ARMIES
JAN 91 CURRENT PERSONNEL
1,200,000 350,000 ARMY DIVS 68
23 TANKS 5950
2662 APC 4800 1780 ARTY
4000 2694
Source - National Geographic
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Iraq Ground Forces as of 30 0030Z Sep 02
36 N
36 N
UNIT Heavy Light Total Regular Army
6 11 17 Republican Guard
4 2 6
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1st REPUBLICAN GUARD CORPS
XXX
1
XX
XX
XX
Neb
Adnan
Hamm
III
II
III
II
II
CMDO
26th
134th
U/I
U/I
U/I
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1st REPUBLICAN GUARD CORPS
XXX
RG
1
III
X
III
III
III
U/I
U/I
593rd
185th
U/I
Training
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REGULAR ARMY I CORPS
XXX
RA
I
Kirkuk HQ
XX
XX
XX
XX
5th
2nd
8th
38th
III
III
X
III
II
II
U/I
136th
I
137th
I
206th
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Iraq No Fly Zone
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IRAQS ARSENAL
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IRAQ MILITARY

• Military Equipment
• Similar/Same Equipment
• AVN Threat
• Rear Area Threat
• Loyalty to Saddam
• Saddam wins 100 of vote
• Political Officer (Hunt For Red October)
• Surrender Rate (Moving Mountains)

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FRIENDLY FORCES

• Britain
• Turkey
• Kuwait
• Saudi Arabia

32
FRIENDLY FORCES

• Vehicles
• Turks T-72
• Brits Chiefton (similar to T-72)

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• Running Logistics for the Gulf War has been
  compared to transporting the entire population of
  Alaska, along with their personal belongings, to
  the other side of the world, on short notice.
• From Armed Forces Journal
  International

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LESSONS LEARNED

• Mobility Tubeless Tires
• Maintenance High-Failure Repair Parts
• Effects on the Individual Desert Wildlife
• Supply Tires
• Climate Flash Floods

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UPCOMING REFERENCES

• Vehicle Recognition Book
• Equipment Smart Book
• Iraqi Smart Book
• RS5 - Culture Handbook

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QUESTIONS
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2nd REPUBLICAN GUARD CORPS
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2nd REPUBLICAN GUARD CORPS
XXX
RG
2nd
II
III
III
II
U/I
886th
162nd
U/I
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REGULAR ARMY III CORPS
XXX
RA
III
Al Basrah Bks
XX
XX
XX
6th
51st
11th
X
II
II
III
III
III
III
III
202nd
U/I
216th 249th
76th 139th
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REGULAR ARMY IV CORPS
XXX
RA
IV
XX
XX
XX
10th
14th
18th
III
III
X
III
II
II
IV
IV
IV
204th
U/I U/I
IV
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REGULAR ARMY V CORPS
XXX
RA
V
XX
XX
XX
XX
4th
7th
1st
16th
X
II
II
III
III
X
III
V
V
205th
185th
137th
V
696th 802nd
Khanhash Depl Area
Tall Aswad Mil Fac
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CAPABILITIES / VULNERABILITIES (1 of 10)
Intelligence Can conduct extensive
Information Operations/PSYOPs on civilian
population Military uses encrypted
communications /- Acquired or produced UAVs
-Does not have the EW equipment, organization,
or expertise to counter regional threats from
Syria, Israel, or Turkey - Intelligence
susceptible to deception and collection assets
can be suppressed by Coalition air attacks or
overwhelmed by the tempo of the Coalition ground
assault
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CAPABILITIES / VULNERABILITIES (2 of 10)

• Maneuver
• Effective Counterinsurgency Operations
  (COINOPs) against internal opposition
  groups
• Vehicles are capable of firing ATGMs
• - Iraq cannot adequately defend against an
  U.S.-led Coalition force.
• - use HETs to deploy heavy divisions
• Ground Forces' capability to fight at night
• is poor

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CAPABILITIES / VULNERABILITIES (3 of 10)

• Fire Support
• Extremely flexible with regards to
  task-organizing artillery
• Can launch missiles with little warning from
  central Iraq to strike at Coalition forces
• Self-propelled artillery is limited and usually
  found with armored divisions

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CAPABILITIES / VULNERABILITIES (4 of 10)

• Mobility / Countermobility
• Maintains a large stockpile of mines
• Heavy divisions have far greater engineering
  capabilities
• Countermine equipment has the capability to
  breach complex obstacles, including mines.
• Defenses may be augmented with oil-filled
  ditches called fire trenches
• Combat engineer units have a wide variety of
  equipment, mines and explosives
• Impressive array of mine-delivery capabilities
  for scatterable and hand/mechanically-emplaced
  mines
• Made up of mostly dismounted infantry which
  limits mobility
• - Fighting and crew served weapons positions,
  bunkers, and trenches built to minimum standards
• - Lack of any true armored combat engineer
  vehicles

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CAPABILITIES / VULNERABILITIES (5 of 10)
Air Defense - Ground forces not organized or
equipped for centralized air battle management
and control of their air defense assets - System
is manual, slow, and leaves engagement decisions
to the individual gunner/weapon/unit - Iraqi
gunners proven to be poorly trained and
disciplined
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CAPABILITIES / VULNERABILITIES (6 of 10)
C2 Frequency hopping radios rapidly change
frequencies to resist jamming and intercept -
Lines of communication susceptible to
interdiction by coalition Air Forces - Lack of
reliable and secure communications
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CAPABILITIES / VULNERABILITIES(7 of 10)

• CSS
• Significant POL and ammunition storage
  facilities in southern Iraq
• Ammunition stockpiles are sufficient to
  support six to seven months of medium-level
  offensive operations
• Ammunition stocks are kept uploaded on trucks
  to expedite rapid delivery and quick transfer to
  subordinate units
• RG provided with the most modern weapons
• in the Iraqi inventory and is equipped at higher
• levels than RA units
• Equipment operability has degraded due
• to age, wear and tear, and poor Maintenance

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CAPABILITIES / VULNERABILITIES(8 of 10)

• - Extended LOCs and limited heavy lift
  transportation ensure resupply delays
• - Logistics infrastructure is hindered by its
  vulnerability to air interdiction
• Maps to personnel below battalion level not
  issued, and many with maps have poor map reading
  skills
• - High desertion rates among litter bearers and
  patients
• - Brigades have no patient treatment or holding
  capability
• - HETs prone to breakdowns during high-tempo
  operations
• RG provided with the most modern weapons in
  the Iraqi inventory and is equipped at higher
  levels than RA units

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CAPABILITIES / VULNERABILITIES(9 of 10)
Air Use attack helicopters to apply rapid
firepower Helicopters can deliver biological
weapons - Helicopter operations severely
degraded due to several factors pilot training,
helicopter maintenance, and parts shortages
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CAPABILITIES / VULNERABILITIES(10 of 10)
NBC Ground troops appear to be well-trained
in NBC defense Capability to produce equipment
and material necessary for biological agent
production and delivery Retains a broad range
of chemical warfare related items Large
quantities of unfilled artillery projectiles,
rockets, and bombs for use as chemical warfare
agent delivery means