Title: Using Simulated Annealing to Calculate the Trembles of Trembling Hand Perfection
1Using Simulated Annealing to Calculate the
Trembles of Trembling Hand Perfection
- Liam Wagner
- Department of Mathematics and
- St Johns College
Stuart McDonald School of Economics
2Outline of Seminar
- Background to the problem
- Computation of Nash equilibria
- Simulated annealing
- Trembling hand algorithm
- Numerical solution of a three person game
- Conclusion
3Background to the Problem
- Trembling hand perfection
- Removing non-optimizing behaviour from sub-game
perfect equilibria - Uses trembles to remove isolated information
sets - Simulated annealing
- Global search algorithm
- Uses trembles to exit local optima
4Background to the Problem
- Is there a connection ?
- Simulated annealing
- Trembling hand perfection
- Can simulated annealing give an algorithm for
trembling hand perfection?
5Computation of Nash Equilibria I
- Well known algorithms
- Lemke and Howson (1964)
- Wilson (1971) and Scarf (1973) for N-person games
- These algorithms utilize the geometric properties
of games - Quantal response equilibria of McKelvey and
Palfrey (1995, 1998) - Trace algorithms of Harsanyi and Selten (1988)
6Computation of Nash Equilibria II
- Use of Monte Carlo simulation to solve games
- Ulam (1954) applied to strategic games
- Georgobiani and Torondzadze (1980) applied to
rectangular games
7Simulated Annealing I
- Simulated annealing is a form Monte Carlo
sampling - Monte Carlo methods sample directly from the
support of the target distribution - Simulated annealing draws its samples from a
Markov chain that converges towards the target
distribution
8Simulated Annealing II
- The algorithm operates via an update rule
- Accept j if the energy function E(j) is greater
than the energy function E(i) on the previously
sampled value i - Accept j if exp((E(j)-E(i))/c) gt U0,1, where c
is the temperature function - The temperature function is important as it
establishes the trembles
9Trembling Hand Algorithm I
- For a Nash equilibrium to satisfy trembling hand
perfection - We define for a game G a perturbed game (G,?),
where ? is a vector of trembles - If the sequence of Nash equilibria generated by
each perturbed game converges, then it will
converge on a perfect equilibrium
10Trembling Hand Algorithm II
- For a perturbed game (G,?), where ? is a vector
of trembles - Each player i's mixed strategy set for (G,?) is
- p is a Nash equilibrium of (G,? ) iff
11Trembling Hand Algorithm III
- As we are moving along a sequence of perturbed
games (G,?(k)) - We accept a mixed strategy a if the payoff
function for each player i - Otherwise accept a if
12Trembling Hand Algorithm IV
- Criteria for convergence to proper equilibrium
- Create a sequence of ?-proper equilibria, where
- For a sequence of ?-proper equilibria, if they
converge, then the point of convergence will be a
proper equilibrium
13Trembling Hand Algorithm V
- We accept a mixed strategy a if for each player I
- Otherwise accept a if
14Trembling Hand Algorithm VI
- Whats going on? We have the following
collection of neighbourhoods - Attach the following probabilities
15Numerical Results I
- The game tree for a three person game (Selten
1975)
16Numerical Results II
- Perturbed pay-off functions
- where the mixed strategies are denoted by the as
and the es are the trembles
17Numerical Results III
- Simulations of the pay-off functions
18Conclusion
- Contribution of this paper
- Working algorithm that certainly provides Nash
equilibria - The example we have used gives what seems to be
the perfect equilibrium
19Conclusion
- Future work must include
- An investigation of the convergence properties
- An investigation of its relation
- Bayesian refinements like Bayes and Markov
perfection - Proper equilibrium
- Sequential equilibrium
20Contact Details
- Stuart McDonald School of Economics,
- s.mcdonald_at_mailbox.uq.edu.au
- Liam Wagner Department of Mathematics,
- LDW_at_maths.uq.edu.au
- http//www.maths.uq.edu.au/ldw