Using Simulated Annealing to Calculate the Trembles of Trembling Hand Perfection

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Using Simulated Annealing to Calculate the Trembles of Trembling Hand Perfection

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Using Simulated Annealing to Calculate the Trembles of Trembling Hand Perfection ... Quantal response equilibria of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998) ... –

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Title: Using Simulated Annealing to Calculate the Trembles of Trembling Hand Perfection


1
Using Simulated Annealing to Calculate the
Trembles of Trembling Hand Perfection
  • Liam Wagner
  • Department of Mathematics and
  • St Johns College

Stuart McDonald School of Economics
2
Outline of Seminar
  • Background to the problem
  • Computation of Nash equilibria
  • Simulated annealing
  • Trembling hand algorithm
  • Numerical solution of a three person game
  • Conclusion

3
Background to the Problem
  • Trembling hand perfection
  • Removing non-optimizing behaviour from sub-game
    perfect equilibria
  • Uses trembles to remove isolated information
    sets
  • Simulated annealing
  • Global search algorithm
  • Uses trembles to exit local optima

4
Background to the Problem
  • Is there a connection ?
  • Simulated annealing
  • Trembling hand perfection
  • Can simulated annealing give an algorithm for
    trembling hand perfection?

5
Computation of Nash Equilibria I
  • Well known algorithms
  • Lemke and Howson (1964)
  • Wilson (1971) and Scarf (1973) for N-person games
  • These algorithms utilize the geometric properties
    of games
  • Quantal response equilibria of McKelvey and
    Palfrey (1995, 1998)
  • Trace algorithms of Harsanyi and Selten (1988)

6
Computation of Nash Equilibria II
  • Use of Monte Carlo simulation to solve games
  • Ulam (1954) applied to strategic games
  • Georgobiani and Torondzadze (1980) applied to
    rectangular games

7
Simulated Annealing I
  • Simulated annealing is a form Monte Carlo
    sampling
  • Monte Carlo methods sample directly from the
    support of the target distribution
  • Simulated annealing draws its samples from a
    Markov chain that converges towards the target
    distribution

8
Simulated Annealing II
  • The algorithm operates via an update rule
  • Accept j if the energy function E(j) is greater
    than the energy function E(i) on the previously
    sampled value i
  • Accept j if exp((E(j)-E(i))/c) gt U0,1, where c
    is the temperature function
  • The temperature function is important as it
    establishes the trembles

9
Trembling Hand Algorithm I
  • For a Nash equilibrium to satisfy trembling hand
    perfection
  • We define for a game G a perturbed game (G,?),
    where ? is a vector of trembles
  • If the sequence of Nash equilibria generated by
    each perturbed game converges, then it will
    converge on a perfect equilibrium

10
Trembling Hand Algorithm II
  • For a perturbed game (G,?), where ? is a vector
    of trembles
  • Each player i's mixed strategy set for (G,?) is
  • p is a Nash equilibrium of (G,? ) iff

11
Trembling Hand Algorithm III
  • As we are moving along a sequence of perturbed
    games (G,?(k))
  • We accept a mixed strategy a if the payoff
    function for each player i
  • Otherwise accept a if

12
Trembling Hand Algorithm IV
  • Criteria for convergence to proper equilibrium
  • Create a sequence of ?-proper equilibria, where
  • For a sequence of ?-proper equilibria, if they
    converge, then the point of convergence will be a
    proper equilibrium

13
Trembling Hand Algorithm V
  • We accept a mixed strategy a if for each player I
  • Otherwise accept a if

14
Trembling Hand Algorithm VI
  • Whats going on? We have the following
    collection of neighbourhoods
  • Attach the following probabilities

15
Numerical Results I
  • The game tree for a three person game (Selten
    1975)

16
Numerical Results II
  • Perturbed pay-off functions
  • where the mixed strategies are denoted by the as
    and the es are the trembles

17
Numerical Results III
  • Simulations of the pay-off functions

18
Conclusion
  • Contribution of this paper
  • Working algorithm that certainly provides Nash
    equilibria
  • The example we have used gives what seems to be
    the perfect equilibrium

19
Conclusion
  • Future work must include
  • An investigation of the convergence properties
  • An investigation of its relation
  • Bayesian refinements like Bayes and Markov
    perfection
  • Proper equilibrium
  • Sequential equilibrium

20
Contact Details
  • Stuart McDonald School of Economics,
  • s.mcdonald_at_mailbox.uq.edu.au
  • Liam Wagner Department of Mathematics,
  • LDW_at_maths.uq.edu.au
  • http//www.maths.uq.edu.au/ldw
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