Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack NY: Simon

1
Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (NY Simon
Schuster, 2004)

• Number II in his Trilogy of the Bush
  Administration Bush at War, Plan of Attack,
  State of Denial

2
Chapter 2

• Woodward begins chapter 2 with how defining 9/11
  was to Bush personally and Bush as president.
  Notes an interesting journal entry likening 9/11
  to Pearl Harbor and argues that Bush is not
  exaggerating when he makes the comparison and
  suggests that it affected Bush similarly.

3
Chapter 2

• Woodward then returns to Bush at War. Four days
  into the crisis, Bush has decided not to hit Iraq
  presently. Woodward has Rumsfeld raising the
  issue. Wolfowitz being hot on the idea of taking
  out Iraq accordingly, Wolfowitz argued Iraq a
  better target. Interestingly, this time though I
  sense a little more circumspection by Rumsfeld
  while wondering if its not an opportunity.
  Bush seems to go out of his way to suggest to
  Woodward that Rummy was simply doing his job in
  examining Iraq early on. Also, Rummy comes off
  as coy and guarded in his real feelingsawaiting
  a wind gauge to assess which way the wind is
  blowing. (See pp. 24-25 Bush covering Rummy a
  year later, p. 26)

4
Chapter 2

• We also learn how integral Andrew Andy Card
  was to Bush. We begin to see that Card was a
  chief of staff with direct policymaking role in
  the NSC principals setting. This is not trivial
  as it gave Card (an ad hoc principal) tremendous
  access on foreign policy as well as public
  policy.

5
Chapter 2

• A tally would show that 4 to 0 against hitting
  Iraq initially, with Rumsfeld abstaining making
  it 4 to 0 to 1. Powell found Rumsfelds
  abstention most interesting. What did it mean?
  he wondered. Rumsfeld had this way of asking
  questionsquestions, questions, questions!and
  not revealing his own position. (Plan, p. 25.)
  Clearly, this is coming from Powell. Powell is
  concerned with Rummy and these chicken hawks
  always quick to send American troops in harms
  way (pp. 25-26). September 14, 2001

6
Chapter 2

• The next afternoon, (September 16, 2001) Condi
  Ricethis is the Camp David series of meetings in
  Bush at Waracting as the conveyor of the message
  from Bush. Bush listens to various takes at the
  meetings, Then Bush seemingly makes a unilateral
  decision apart from the meeting. It appears very
  differently than Bush senior who would argue
  around the table with his advisers. Its
  difficult to tell if Bush goes off and makes
  decisions, implied, or whether Cheney, Rice, or
  someone else gets a second bite of the apple
  absent NSC principals. Though Libby doesnt come
  up here, from other reading it seems pretty clear
  Wolfowitz and or Libby are in this group as ad
  hoc principals.

7
Chapter 2

• September 17, Bush signs top secret finding for
  Pearl. It allows CIA and others to conduct
  covert actions against terrorists worldwide. (p.
  26.) Interesting to compare Bushs interview
  tidbits from one year after and two years after
  9/11 (pp. 26-27). Also, it belies some of
  Tenets subsequent recollections that Bushand
  even Clintonhad already given all the authority
  necessary!

8
Chapter 2

• Now comes Cheney.
• Cheney, the 61-year old conservative hard liner,
  had already carved out a special position in the
  administration and held great sway with the
  president. He was a resume vice president
  White House chief of staff to President Ford at
  age 34 then 10 years as the only congressman
  from Wyoming, his how state briefly the No. 2
  House Republican leader before being selected by
  Bushs father to be secretary of defense in 1989.
  Thought by many Republicans to be the best
  qualified in their party for the presidency,
  Cheney had considered running in 1996. But he
  found the fund-raising and media scrutiny
  distasteful, and was named CEO of Halliburton, .
  . . in 1995. He served until Bush picked him to
  be his running mate in the summer of 2000 with
  these words If times are good, Im going to
  need your advice, but not nearly as much as if
  times are bad. (27-28.)

9
Chapter 2

• His role as veep expansion of the traditional
  role of veep. In Bush 43, Cheney was going to be
  an insider and a specialist on national security
  threats. Cheney (and retired Admiral Steve
  Abbott) but no mention here of Libby! Carves out
  his role as expert on national-security threats,
  WMD, terrorism, etc. (p. 29). We will read later
  he was the self-appointed examiner of worst-case
  scenarios.

10
Chapter 3

• Woodward begins looking closely at Rummy again
  in chapter 3. He goes through Rummys
  bull-in-china-shop brashness in terms of hauling
  in war planners and contingency planners in the
  Pentagon and questions the assumptions of their
  various war plans for some 70 contingencies.
  Rummy comes off looking brilliant, tempestuous,
  (embarrassing colonels), and disdainful of the
  Clinton defense department (pp. 33-35). He makes
  a nice little summary paragraph next

11
Chapter 3

• This was four and one-half months before Bush
  formally announced his preemption sic doctrine.
  Rumsfeld was thinking of a future when the U.S.
  should be ready to strike first. The thing is
  clearly this came from either Rummy himself,
  implied, or Wolfowitz. I initially read this
  sort of thing and credited Rumsfeld with more
  influence than he actually had I think. Instead,
  the persons whose fingerprints are more
  difficult to trace is Cheney. Reflect in my NSC
  book versus Hydra.

12
Chapter 3

• Rumsfelds real influence appears to be in
  shaking up the bureaucracy. Its clear from
  other readings that when Cheney and Bush deciding
  on who would be asked to be secretary of
  defensefirst slice was Dan Coates from Indiana
  who interviewed badlyRumsfeld felt he had
  unfinished business left from his first tour as
  youngest sec def. He was intellectually
  confident enough to be thinking in terms of how
  the DOD had to be transformed for 21st century
  and how Rumsfeld was the sort of bold leadership
  who would transform it. Makes Rumsfeld seem more
  interested with those big issues.

13
Chapter 3

• Also Tenets coverage confirms that Rumsfeld
  knew initially that DOD was not ready to lead
  into Afghanistan and bided his time. By
  examining SOPs and their assumptions, he forced
  the Pentagon to questions its assumptions. (See
  pp. 34-38, 40-42). See Rumsfelds own self
  assessment on p. 44. My thoughts on Rumsfeld.

14
Chapter 3

• There is an element of drama here with Woodward
  describing a British MI6 (Secret Intelligence
  Services) covert op in Pakistan and concluding
  that Pakistan was at least an unwitting
  proliferator. Bush responds by sending Tenet to
  Pakistan in late 2001. The result is the U.S.
  govt believedas did Saudis and othersthat al
  Qaeda was intent on getting WMD, if they didnt
  already have them, and the U.S. anticipating the
  use of a dirty bomb, if not the real thing in the
  U.S. Chapter 4, pp. 46-48. Big difference
  between Bush 43 and 41 for DCI latter
  traditional, non-operational, non-policymaking
  role. Also, Tenet makes clear that AQ Khan
  network surprised Musharraf more than once as
  Tenet briefed Musharraf on what had occurred
  under his nose.

15
Chapter 4

• Now comes Scooter Libby. He hold three
  titles chief of staff to the veep
  national-security advisor to veep and assistant
  to the president. (p. 48.) Libby as a protégé
  of Paul Wolfowitz Libby as a former assistant
  secretary of state for Wolfowitz during late
  1980s Libby as former policy undersecretary for
  Cheney while Cheney secretary of defense
  (1988-1992), p. 48. In his current role, Libby
  was one of only two people who were not
  statutory principals to attend the National
  Security Council meetings with the president and
  the separate principals meetings chaired by Rice.
  (The other was Rices deputy, Stephen Hadley.)
  (p. 48-49.)

16
Chapter 4

• From his unique vantage point, Libby watched
  and participated in the debate and development of
  the presidents national security policy. Since
  Cheney did not have direct operational
  responsibility for the military, diplomacy, or
  intelligenceor anything else for that
  matterneither the vice president nor Libby had
  to get caught up in the daily firefights or
  crises, unless, of course, they chose to insert
  themselves. They both could try to tend to the
  largest matters of policy and decision. In the
  end, Libby knew, Cheneys only product was
  adviceto the National Security Council, and most
  importantly and most directly, to the president
  (p. 49).

17
Chapter 4

• Libby as one who like to immerse himself in
  details. Libby and Wolfowitz, during the first
  Gulf War, proposing placing covert operatives,
  Special Operations Commando teams, in the west of
  Iraq to protect Israel. (Ibid.) Libby,
  retrospectively, apparently believed that had
  General Schwartzkopf, used their idea, he
  wouldnt have had to tie down so much of his air
  power to guarding western Iraq. A New York Times
  piece that identifies Libby, shortly after 9/11
  and his response thereto he goes to Armitage
  and tells him Libby is used to seeing Powells
  name in the paper (a salvo!) but not his own and
  he didnt care for it. Its about what will work
  and what wont, not personal pettiness, so on.

18
Chapter 4

• Libby felt that keeping the focus on
  Afghanistan initially was wise, and now with
  Afghanistan going well, he believed if the war on
  terrorism was properly and broadly defined that
  Iraq had to be dealt with. Late 2001. It was
  impossible, in his view, to deal definitively
  with terrorism, as he put it privately, without
  facing up to the issue of Iraq. (p. 50.) In
  Tenets book, Richard Perle who was on the
  Defense Advisory board met Tenet as latter was
  heading into the White House where Perle tells
  Tenet that the U.S had to go after and punish
  Iraq on thisTenet was stunned and somewhat
  suspicious of whom Perle had been meeting with
  precisely. Weve discussed!

19
Chapter 4

• Libby is watching the president closely in
  meetings. Hes looking for body language and so
  on. Maybe it wasnt a war decision, Libby felt,
  but the president had decided that the Iraq
  problem was going to be solved one way or the
  other. (Ibid.)!
• Note confirmation coming from Libby to
  Woodward that the decision to go to Iraq was made
  in early 2002.

20
Chapter 5

• The president is at the ranch in Crawford in
  December 2001. Hes getting briefings by secure
  link or in person in a special room, a Sensitive
  Compartmented Information Facility. On December
  28, 2001, the threat matrix, a story broken by
  Woodward in the Washington Post, is briefed to
  Bush. Tenet has a chapter on the matrix and how
  it was an improvised response to 9/11 that became
  the basis for countless briefings including a
  daily CIA afternoon meeting for some 2-3 years
  running after 9/11. Recall, it was around this
  same time that the concerns of dirty bombs or
  nukes is also pushing the administration.

21
Chapter 5

• Interestingly, Bush has just finished reading
  biography on Teddy Roosevelt whose thesis is
  Theodore Roosevelt used power decisively,
  definitively, bordering on arrogantlybut that
  was the proper way and what made him a great
  president. Theodore Rex, by Edmund Morris. (pp.
  53-54.)

22
Chapter 5

• Rumsfelds breaking china at Pentagon has paid
  off as Franks secure video conference with Bush
  with newly designed war plan for Iraq. A new
  construct, not just military, but one that drew
  on all elements of national power (pp. 54-56.)
  Franks plan, and it if I recall correctly this
  is when Bush is at Crawford late 2001 appears
  quite brilliant in retrospect, projected a
  tentative start date in Iraq of between April and
  June, 2002, were the president to say go now (p.
  60.) At the end the president tells Franks good
  job and keep grinding away.

23
Chapter 5

• Rumsfeld had seemed to want to jump in two or
  three times during Franks briefing but the
  technology made him only one remote figure on a
  screen filled with others. (p. 63.) The press
  conference after the meeting seems to indicate
  the Franks was there in person, Cheney was
  probably in Washington as apparently was
  Rumsfeld, Rice was in both places. (See p. 65.)
  Also see how Bush, two years later, characterized
  the meeting and how Woodward characterizes Bush
  based on his interviews (p. 66). Bush does not
  think the U.S. is ready to take out Iraq at this
  point but he knows Iraq is a threat and that the
  US has options. There are at least two
  accounts, Woodwards Bush at War and Tenets that
  have a vote with Rumsfeld abstaining . . . .

24
Chapter 6

• Some pretty positive stuff on Tenet and Saul,
  the director of ops for the regions that included
  Iraq. Then, In the first months after 9/11,
  Iraq took a back seat, though Vice President
  Cheney asked the CIA to brief him on what they
  could do. On January 3, 2002, Saul, Tenet, the
  deputy chief of the Near East division and two
  covert operators who had worked Iraq programs
  went to see the vice president and Scooter
  Libby. (p. 72.)?

25
Chapter 6

• The end of the chapter is interesting for what
  the participants apparently told Woodward after
  the fact, perhaps well after. It has Cheney
  being refreshed by the CIAs bluntness that they
  couldnt do it alonetoo many FUBARs of cutting
  and running and stringing the Iraqi opposition
  out. In fact, we now know that Cheney has an
  ongoing feud with CIA and thinks them incapable
  of getting it right. It has Saul, telling it
  like it is and the president thinking to himself,
  oh darn, no sucker punch to be had against
  Saddam.

26
Chapter 6

• It has Rice comprehending, at the time, how
  difficult it was going to be to have a
  bifurcated policy of diplomacy on the one hand
  and planning, sub rosa, on the other. And it has
  Powell wisely doubting it all and coming off the
  sage of the administration. It appears that each
  camp talked to Woodward and told him how they
  were thinking at the time! (See pp. 72-74.) my
  recollection is put out story just before
  Woodwards book released in which Cheney was
  characterized as not participating?

27
Chapter 7

• After all the late December 2001 flurry of
  activity, Rumsfeld has Franks rework things and
  to be ready for a January 9, 2002 meeting. Then
  turns to Powell and again how the cagey former
  general knew that of which he spoke war was a
  terrible thing, as Confederate General Robert E.
  Lee said, and it was a good thing lest everyone
  grow too fond of it. Powell had frustrations
  that he was not fully on the inside as Rumsfeld,
  Cheney, and others appeared. He had not formed
  personal bonds with Bush and for the Bushes,
  personal bonds were everything.

28
Chapter 7

• He reminisces on the week before 9/11 (in my
  book) where Time comes out with Where Have You
  Gone piece on Powell. Sufficiently troubled that
  he eventually uses his good offices to reach out
  to Tommy Franks, probably a poor decision, when
  one stops to think how its going to be seen by
  Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and probably Cheney. See
  David Von Drehle, Wrestling With History
  Sometimes You Have to Fight The War You Have, Not
  The War You Wish You Had Washington Post,
  11/13/2005, p. W12. Even Tenet makes clear the
  decision to invade Iraq was relatively early in
  2002.

29
Chapter 8

• Begins with Gerson, speechwriter, musing about
  early 2002. He was working on Bushs state of
  the union speech and he realized he (they) had a
  plastic, teachable momenta paradigm shift, a
  time when the president had to educate and teach
  the nation about how the world had changed, how
  the next 50 years the threat was going to be
  terrorism! (See p. 85.) A reorientation of US
  foreign and defense policy. (pp. 85-86.) Very
  interesting intersection between Gerson, David
  Frum who coined axis of hatred, and Cheney who
  had internally brought up the connection between
  WMD and terrorism in the summer of 2000, just
  after he joined the ticket. See first full
  paragraph, p. 87.!

30
Chapter 8

• Gerson remembered that when Cheney had joined
  the ticket in the summer of 2000, Cheney had
  raised the connection between WMD and terrorism
  in internal campaign discussions. . . . So
  Gerson changed Frums phrase axis of hatred
  to axis of evil, broadening the notion, making
  it more sinister, even wicked. It was almost as
  if Saddam was an agent of the devil. The
  connection between his regime with WMD and
  international terrorism could put the world on
  the road to Armageddon (87).

31
Chapter 8

• Apropos Bushs state of the union speech for
  2002, Woodward then turns again to Libby
  interestingly. Note Libby was indicted
  October 28, 2005 with 1 count obstruction of
  justice, 2 counts of perjury, and 2 counts of
  false statements. Subsequent to when I first
  read this, during summer 2007 Bush commuted
  Libbys prison term. Woodward begins the
  section with In the vice presidents suite on
  the second floor of the OEOB, Libby is going
  over drafts of the speechit doesnt give a date.
  He reads the axis of evil line and is somewhat
  concerned that it indicates, before the
  administration was ready to indicate, that the US
  was going after Iraq. He favored adding other
  rogue nations including Iran, DPRK, and Syria!
  (p. 90.) Woodward simply notes that his
  suggestion for Syria got nowhere with either Rice
  or Hadley (Rices deputy then, the NSC advisor in
  2005).

32
Chapter 8

• Woodward shifts back to defense. Apparently,
  Rumsfeld had not read the speech, a priori, or if
  he did not in a way that would allow him to
  comment on it and or change it. Interesting.
  Neither had Wolfowitz who read the speech after
  the fact and was pleased the president had
  driven the stake into terrorism and states who
  sponsor it. The speech showed that the
  president had been listening to some of the
  things Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz had been saying
  about the connection between weapons of mass
  destruction and terrorism (93). This is
  interesting first, it indicates that Cheneys
  office is part of the speech process even though
  Rumsfelds office is not, or was not at that
  time. Second, it may say something about Rices
  influence being stronger than some think. Third,
  if true about Rice, it raises question about her
  role then compared to her agenda nowin
  2005where she has been much more active as
  secretary and begs questions about what has
  changed.

33
Chapter 8

• Check out Woodwards section on Krauthammer and
  how he took the speech and spun it into a virtual
  declaration of war on Iraq. Krauthammer was
  probably correct in his interpretation but he was
  also trying to set the conservative agenda
  through his Op-Ed piece. (p. 95.)
• The power of the punditocracy. Ken Adlemans
  op-ed pieces come up in Woodwards book and both
  of my books have chapters on societal including
  pundits.

34
Chapter 9

• Bush at National Prayer Breakfast on February 7,
  2002. Very Christian theme of strength from
  tribulations and 9/11 was said tribulation (p.
  98). (Woodward had just pages earlier noted that
  Bush told Rove, just after 9/11, that Bush was
  here for a reason, and this is how were going to
  be judged (p. 91).

35
Chapter 9

• Same day as the prayer breakfast, February 7,
  2002 the president and his national security
  team sic. met in the situation room (p. 98).
  Interesting stuff it seems functional Bush
  seems to understand gravity Franks gives Bush
  realistic time assessment of when the US could be
  ready to go into Iraq (p. 100)between November,
  December (2002) and out until February 2003. As
  we know, it was March 2003. Rumsfeld introduces
  shock and awe apparently in this meeting.
  Powell seems satisfied that nobody was trigger
  happy and nobody had any crazy-ass ideas about
  Iraq. Then Woodward turns to Cheney. Cheney
  thought the war plan took too long to unfold (p.
  103). Odd for a veep but perhaps not for former
  secdef.

36
Chapter 9

• Then Woodward returns to Cheney. Cheney was
  planning a trip to the Middle East and
  consequently spoke to Franks to inquire as to
  what countries might be ripe for veep
  solicitation. The CJCS is by law the contact for
  NSC principals. The CINCs have an alternative
  chain of command. This is somewhat strange. Why
  Franks? Franks is an Army Command chief. What
  info would Franks have on that? Why did Cheney
  not ask State? This is States portfolio. Is
  this simply the case of Cheney not wishing to
  work with his old bureaucratic rival, Powell? Is
  it more sinister? Less? On March 6, Franks
  briefs Cheney! (P. 111.)

37
Chapter 10

• Then Cheney on whirlwind trip to area. March
  2002 Lands on US carrier USS Stennis.
  Interesting paragraph about Cheneys encounters
  virtually every leader in the area pounded Cheney
  not on gsave or Iraq but, rather, when was the
  administration going to throw its weight behind a
  middle east peace process? Woodward notes that
  this had been a Powell hobby horse and that
  Franks generally agreed with it US must think
  about settling the Israeli-Palestinian process as
  core for everything else. Interesting in light
  of the Annapolis summit.

38
Chapter 10

• By mid to late March (2002) Franks now believes
  that Bush is going to take US to war in Iraq (p.
  113) Woodward pegs it to March 21. Very
  interesting note on JCS simulation Prominent
  Hammer, March 23. First, it didnt leak until
  two months after the simulation. Second, it
  found that Iraq was going to place incredible
  strains on the militarylogistically, physically,
  emotionally, . . (pp. 114-115).

39
Chapter 11

• Interesting stuff on cultural of Pentagon.
  Franks is purple and not beholding to any
  service. Yet he needs to brief them on whats
  coming. He enters enemy territory the tank in
  the Pentagon. He calls the service chiefs Title
  X motherfuckers. (pp. 116-119). Title 10 is a
  reference to Goldwater-Nichols Act, 1986.

40
Chapter 12

• Bush telling Rove to stop bothering Bush. It
  has to do with problems between Rove who wished
  to use Afghanistan politically to bolster Bush
  and Powell who wished to appear an apolitical
  secretary of state.
• Then Woodward returns to Cheney.

41
Chapter 12

• Cheney apparently felt the real foreign policy
  struggle within the administration was not over
  Rove but Powell (p. 128). Interesting Cheney
  comment in the context of Iran. Apparently, two
  camps existed in the administration about Iran.
  One argued that two camps existed within Iran
  Khatami and reformers vs. theocracy and Khamenei.
  Now Khatami is gone, of course.
• The other camp believed they were two sides of
  same coin. Cheney acknowledges the debate,
  though to whom is not clear. He then relates it
  to Powell and Rumsfeld The same question
  applies to Don Rumsfeld and Colin Powell (p.
  129). Woodward goes on to discuss preemption
  and the differences between Powells view and
  Rumsfelds. Iran

42
Chapter 12

• Interesting stuff on continuity in US foreign
  policy. June 1 speech Bush gives to US military
  academy in New York (I think the West Points
  speech in 2002 national-security strategy).
  Bushs speech writer Gerson goes back to Truman
  1947 speech to link Bushs mission in a new world
  with Trumans during a similarly new world. (pp.
  130-31.) Then something about Cheney, since the
  2000 campaign, linking WMD and terrorism.
  Cheney had been raising these questions about
  the potential threat of terrorists acquiring
  weapons of mass destruction . . . . Since 9/11
  it had become Cheneys obsession (p. 131 my
  emphasis).

43
Chapter 13

• On July29-29 the Washington Post and the New
  York Times ran front-page stories on Iraq war
  planning (July 29, 2002). Rest of the chapter is
  about CIA covert ops in northern Iraq with the
  Kurds. The infamous Tim is in it, as it was
  recalled in Bush at War and or elsewhere. Not
  especially relevant for purposes of this course.

44
Chapter 13

• On July29-29 the Washington Post and the New
  York Times ran front-page stories on Iraq war
  planning (July 29, 2002). Rest of the chapter is
  about CIA covert ops in northern Iraq with the
  Kurds. The infamous Tim is in it, as it was
  recalled in Bush at War and or elsewhere. Not
  especially relevant for purposes of this course.

45
Chapter 14

• Chapter begins with Franks again in early August
  2002. It then shifts to Powell without carefully
  constructing a timeline. The implication is the
  Powell section begins around same time, early
  August.
• Powell is on edge! All the stuff hes hearing
  and reading in the papers suggested a mad rush to
  militarize Iraq. Powells view, by implication,
  is that there were many things that could be done
  short of war.
• The result is Powell is angling for private time
  with Bush to lay out his own thoughts on Iraq.
  Bush invites Powell and Rice to dinner on August
  5, 2002. This is the famous talk about Bush
  being the owner of however many millions of
  Iraqis, their aspirations, etc. Rice, apparently
  speaking to Woodward, thought the next days
  headline was Powell Makes Case for Coalition
  As Only Way to Assure Success (pp. 149-51).

46
Chapter 14

• Woodward is interviewing people well after the
  fact. One is president Bush who, during his
  interview, thought back and characterized what
  Powell had been saying. First, it was Powells
  job to think tactically it was Bushs job to
  think strategically. Second, some in the
  administration thought much could be done
  multilaterally and diplomatically others in the
  administration did not. Apparently virtually
  everyone believed the UN had behaved fecklessly.
  Then Bush saying to Woodward the following.
  Colin felt very strongly that the United Nations
  was the route to go. And some in the
  administration had seen how feckless the United
  Nations had been on this issue and were uncertain
  as to whether or not the United Nations would be
  able to get it done. Then Woodward writes He
  acknowledged that one of those was the vice
  president (pp. 152-53 quotes p. 153). The next
  day the president headed to Crawford for nearly a
  month of vacation. August 2002

47
Chapter 15

• August 14, 2002 Rice chaired an NSC principals
  meeting. The meeting was called to discuss what
  the deputies meetings had pushed forward goals
  and objectives in Iraq. Woodward describes the
  coalition if possible, go it alone if necessary
  approach that many administrations had taken.
  Then Rarely, however, had there been such deep
  division within a national security team sic.
  as between Cheney and Powell. Each had a
  fundamentally different definition of what was
  possible, and what was necessary (p. 155).

48
Chapter 15

• From Cheneys mouth to Bushs brain! Woodward
  has Bush at Crawford on the second Friday of his
  vacation thereits August 16, 2002. Scowcroft,
  back in Washington and working as a consultant,
  is worrying about what hes hearing about Iraq.
  He pens an oped piece that runs in the Wall
  Street Journal in which he argues theres no
  connection between Saddam and bin Laden other
  that they both hate the US. Powell phones him
  and thanks him for cover Powell apparently tells
  Scowcroft Powell needs to use the opening to its
  advantage.

49
Chapter 15

• Rice phones Scowcroft (who was formerly her boss
  at NSC) and has sharp words with Scowcroft. Bush
  gives press briefing at Crawford city center in
  which he acknowledges that smart people are
  concerned about the administrations apparent
  tilt toward war in Iraq. Bush then phones
  Gerson, with Rice on the phone (its not clear
  where Rice is) and states that Gerson needs to
  make the UN speechthe one debated just days
  earlier by NSC principalsdifferent. Now, he
  instructs Gerson to make the speech about how the
  UN must confront Iraq or condemn itself to
  obsolescence for the future. Cheneys feelings
  are coming out of Bushs mouth. How?? (See pp.
  159-161.) Also note that by time Powell gets
  personal time with bush, on Aug. 5, 2002,
  Cheney has already had his say with Bush for
  months

50
Chapter 15

• Bush meets with Woodward during this time in
  Crawford. In explaining his administrations
  position on Iraq he tells Woodward how horrible
  Iraq is under Saddam and how the US must think in
  terms of liberating subjugated peoples,
  democratization, and nothing about weapons of
  mass destruction. (162-63.) Whatever else one
  may wish to say about Bush, he truly seemed to
  believe the administrations own hyperbolic
  rhetoric. You can say that he was blinded by
  hubrisand indeed I do say thatbut I have spent
  some 6 years now studying 9/11 and its aftermath.
  I have found NO evidence that Bush consciously
  lied. He embellished to be sure and Im less
  confident of saying the same of Cheney.

51
Chapter 15

• Cheney, apparently in Washington, senses hes
  losing ground to caution and those urging it,
  read Powell. Hes bugged by the Scowcroft piece
  and exercised that a New York Times editorial
  has, in Cheneys view, mischaracterized
  Kissingers view from another piece. The Times
  eventually ran a correction, but Cheney and his
  deputy, Scooter Libby, found the article
  extremely aggravating (163) and the correction
  would never catch up with the front page
  headline, sic. and Scowcrofts dissent was
  indisputable and more potent. It looked as if
  the march to war was put off (Ibid). Indeed, so
  bothered are the two that Cheney decides to make
  a major speech. This is highly unusual as Bush
  was then scheduled to give a major speech to the
  UN on September 12the speech Gerson was working
  on for Bush. But Cheney uses his influence and
  demonstrates his influence and propriety, by
  going to Bush and getting his permission to put
  out the administrations position. (Ibid.)

52
Chapter 15

• Another NSC meeting, apparently principals plus,
  and without a clear date. It appears that its
  near the end of August. And my sense is that
  Bush is back in Washington though Woodward does
  not make clear. What he does detail is the
  following telling exchange
• At an NSC meeting, Cheney said to the president,
  Well, Im going to give that speech.
• Dont get me in trouble, Bush half-joked.
• Trouble is what Cheney had in mind.

53
Chapter 15

• And then Woodward begins the next paragraph with
  the newspaper headline of Cheneys speech and the
  story it generated. The paper ran Cheney Says
  Peril of Nuclear Iraq Justifies Attack, in the
  New York Times. The vice president had
  delivered a hard-line address to the Veterans of
  foreign Wars convention in Nashville and
  basically called weapons inspection futile.
  Woodward has Powell dumbfounded. And
  amazingly, Woodward continues note my records
  indicate said speech on 8-26-2002

54
Chapter 15

• The vice president also issued his own personal
  National Intelligence Estimate of Saddam
  Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam
  Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction and
  there is no doubt that he is amassing them to use
  against our friends, against our allies and
  against us. Ten days earlier the president
  himself said only that Saddam desires these
  weapons. Neither Bush nor the CIA had made any
  assertion comparable to Cheneys (p. 164).
• . . . .

55
Chapter 15

• These remarks, just short of a declaration of
  war, were widely interpreted as administration
  policy. Powell was astonished. It was a
  preemptive attack on what the president had
  agreed to 10 days earlier. Cheneys speech blew
  it all up. Now Powell felt boxed in. To add to
  his problem, the BBC started releasing excerpts
  of an interview Powell had given before Cheneys
  speech asserting, The president has been clear
  that he believes weapons inspectors should
  return. Stories began appearing that Powell was
  contradicting Cheney. He was accused of
  disloyalty, and he counted seven editorials
  calling for his resignation or implying he should
  quit. How can I be disloyal, he wondered, when
  Im giving the presidents stated position?
  (Ibid.)

56
Chapter 15

• Then in another stunning revelation, Woodward
  turns to Ken Adelman, former Reaganaut and former
  assistant to Rummy. Adelman writes a piece
  published in the Wall Street Journal arguing Iraq
  is more dangerous than al Qaeda Saddam has a
  country, billions in oil revenue, and so forth.
  The stunning part is in the connection to Cheney.
  Woodward makes it sound as if it was after the
  fact but I really wonder now in 2005 having just
  had indictments against Libby yesterday. In any
  case, Cheney lets it be known through common
  friends that Adelmans piece was just what he
  needed inside the administration (165).
  Apparently, much of this happened while Bush was
  still in Crawford!

57
Chapter 16

• Bush returns to White House on September 1,
  2002. Bush tells the principals that he wishes
  to go to the Congress to get their blessing. And
  again demonstrating the influence of Cheney
• Having spent the better part of a month trying
  to sort out the international and United Nations
  issues, which were still not settled, Bushs team
  only required one principals meeting to figure
  out the domestic politics. In the discussion,
  there was a lot of deference to Cheney, who had
  served in Congress and was president of the
  Senate. (p. 167 my emphasis.)

58
Chapter 16

• Bush returns to White House on September 1,
  2002. Bush tells the principals that he wishes
  to go to the Congress to get their blessing. And
  again demonstrating the influence of Cheney
• Having spent the better part of a month trying
  to sort out the international and United Nations
  issues, which were still not settled, Bushs team
  only required one principals meeting to figure
  out the domestic politics. In the discussion,
  there was a lot of deference to Cheney, who had
  served in Congress and was president of the
  Senate. (p. 167 my emphasis.)

59
Cheneys VFW Speech

• http//www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20
  020826.html
• Vice President Speaks at VFW 103rd National
  Convention Remarks by the Vice President to the
  Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National
  Convention
• . . . .
• We will continue working with VFW leaders and
  members on homeland security, drawing upon your
  experiences in military and civilian life. And we
  share common cause on the matter of servicemen
  whose fate is still undetermined. For all the
  uncertainties that remain, the basic issue is
  clear thousands of brave Americans, last seen
  doing their duty, remain unaccounted for. The
  nation remembers these men, and this government
  will persist in the effort to account for every
  last one of them. (Applause.)

60
Cheneys VFW Speech

• As we meet all of these commitments, our
  administration is moving forward on an agenda to
  build a safe and prosperous future for the
  American people. We have laid the foundation for
  greater prosperity and opportunity with the most
  significant education reforms in 35 years, with
  free trade legislation to open up markets to
  American producers, with tough new laws to ensure
  corporate integrity and honest accounting, with
  spending discipline in Washington and with the
  largest federal tax reduction in twenty years.
  my emphasis

61
Cheneys VFW Speech

• Much has happened since the attacks of 9/11.
  But as Secretary Rumsfeld has put it, we are
  still closer to the beginning of this war than we
  are to its end. The United States has entered a
  struggle of years -- a new kind of war against a
  new kind of enemy. The terrorists who struck
  America are ruthless, they are resourceful, and
  they hide in many countries. They came into our
  country to murder thousands of innocent men,
  women, and children. There is no doubt they wish
  to strike again, and that they are working to
  acquire the deadliest of all weapons. my
  emphasis

62
Cheneys VFW Speech

• It is a certainty that the al Qaeda network is
  pursuing such weapons, and has succeeded in
  acquiring at least a crude capability to use
  them. We found evidence of their efforts in the
  ruins of al Qaeda hideouts in Afghanistan. And
  we've seen in recent days additional confirmation
  in videos recently shown on CNN -- pictures of al
  Qaeda members training to commit acts of terror,
  and testing chemical weapons on dogs. Those
  terrorists who remain at large are determined to
  use these capabilities against the United States
  and our friends and allies around the world.

63
Cheneys VFW Speech

• The case of Saddam Hussein, a sworn enemy of
  our country, requires a candid appraisal of the
  facts. After his defeat in the Gulf War in 1991,
  Saddam agreed under to U.N. Security Council
  Resolution 687 to cease all development of
  weapons of mass destruction.

64
Cheneys VFW Speech

• . . . .
• Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam
  Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction.
  There is no doubt he is amassing them to use
  against our friends, against our allies, and
  against us. And there is no doubt that his
  aggressive regional ambitions will lead him into
  future confrontations with his neighborsconfronta
  tions that will involve both the weapons he has
  today, and the ones he will continue to develop
  with his oil wealth.

65
Chapter 16

• Interesting description of the White House Iraq
  Coordination Meeting which would subsequently be
  called the White House Iraq Group (WHIG). It
  appears to have political advisers in addition to
  the national-security advisers of various kinds.
  It also demonstrates how active Andy Card was as
  an ad hoc NSC principal (see p.168 and 172 for
  example). All this leads, the next day (August 4,
  2002), to Bush having specific senators over to
  inform them of what the administration needed and
  so on.

66
Chapter 16

• It seems pretty difficult for critics to claim
  ignorance given how much the administration
  openly told them. So Bush is being told, and
  directed by Cheney that said weapons are a
  certainty and that they cant stand. Bush is
  telling Woodward, in a contemporaneous interview,
  that its all about thwarting tyranny and freedom
  for downtrodden peoples, noticeable neglecting to
  cite weapons of mass destruction as rationale.
  Extraordinary influence from Cheney that is
  direct in some cases and indirect in others.
  With respect to the latter, Cheney essentially
  setting agenda thereby moving the bar so that
  previous positions (Powells coalition and UN)
  positions are rendered obsolete. And we now know
  that in order for Cheneys position to prevail as
  it did, no hint that Saddam did not have said
  weapons would have been a setback.

67
Chapter 16

• Very intriguing bit of info on an apparent NSC
  meeting (presumably principals) in which Franks
  blurts out that he hasnt found a SCUD. The
  significance is that the intelligence was not
  functioning well if the intelligence was
  insufficient for Franks to find SCUDs, what else
  might the intelligence be wrong about? (See p
  173.) Later when Woodward reports the sources
  the CIA ran in the couple months before the war
  some of them are insiders. Why are they not
  probed about WMD? The die was cast, apparently.

68
Chapter 16

• Thus, it is not completely surprising that Libby
  would attempt to smear Wilson the following year.
  Cheney and Libby seem to be fighting a
  rear-guard action not just against enemies from
  outside (the media, pundits, Republican stalwarts
  such as Scowcroft) but enemies within (Powell).
  This does not preclude Cheney and Libby truly
  believing that Saddam had WMD. The veep,
  inarguably the most powerful one in US history,
  sees the administration policy in zero-sum terms.
  If Powell and others position that the US
  should go slow, build coalitions, and so forth is
  winning, Cheneys position is by definition
  losing. The irony here is that Saddam amazingly
  plays into the neocons hand by encouraging the
  administration to believe Saddam has WMD as a
  deterrence strategy.

69
Chapter 16

• Those who argue otherwise must be enemies,
  whether they work for the same US government or
  not.
• A Camp David meeting where Powell and Cheney
  keep going at each other. The issue was another
  UN resolutionand there would come one more
  subsequently that Cheney argued against but Bush
  okayed to protect Tony Blair.

70
Chapter 16

• Powell detected a kind of fever in Cheney. He
  was not the steady, unemotional rock that
  Powell had witnessed a dozen years earlier
  during the run-up to the Gulf War. The vice
  president was beyond hell bent for action against
  Saddam. It was as if nothing else existed (173).

71
Chapter 16

• Woodward describes their bickering as follows.
  The conversation exploded into a tough debate
  between the two men, who danced on the edge of
  civility but did not depart the formal deference
  they generally showed each other. It was sharp
  and biting, however, and they both knew how to
  score debating points as they pulled apart the
  last fraying threads of what had connected them
  for so many years. Powell appeared to harbored a
  deep-seated anger even though he won the debate.
  (175.) On the next page it continues with Powell
  be confounded by Cheney and their relationship.
  Ultimately Bush sided with Powell but it was for
  Tony Blair rather than Powell (178).

72
Chapter 18

• Interesting discussion of former Senator Bob
  Grahams prescience on the Iraq war (192-93).
  Again Cheney comes up in an unusual way. Graham
  had not talked to Bush but apparently had with
  Cheney? Graham notices how facile Cheney is when
  he conflates WMD and Iraq (which they used to
  great success ultimately to get congress and
  Americans to go along with the Iraq invasion and,
  of course, became the game the used in 2004 for
  the presidents re-election bud). Graham
  asserted that the Bush administration, or at
  least Cheney, had changed the definition of the
  war on terrorism (193), something in which
  Senator Graham truly believed and supported
  fully. Woodward then goes on for several pages
  about the NIE produced under pressure and
  misconstrued. We will revisit with Tenet since he
  was there. That NIE, which was subsequently
  hyped, according to Woodward, resulted in the
  Congressional vote to authorize all force
  necessary to protect the U.S. (203.) It was the
  classic bums rush.

73
Chapter 19

• Rumsfeld again and how he browbeat the uniformed
  military into submission. My own view is he did
  abuse them but they should have been prepared to
  standup to him and his Gestapo as others called
  them Libby, Feith in particular, Wolfowitz,
  Cambone, et al. When Rumsfeld allowed the chiefs
  to meet with the presidentclearly counter to
  the1986 Goldwater-Nichols Acthe had his Cheney
  in the room, presumably to further intimidate
  them. Rumsfeld wanted the ciefs to meet only
  with the president, without General Franks the
  combatant commader. Wolfowitz, Hadley, and
  Libby were also excluded, though Cheney, Rice,
  and Card attended (207).

74
Chapter 19

• The chapter then segues into what CIA and
  special forces were doing some of which is quite
  interesting and well devised (give credit to
  Tenet mostly). One thing sort of bothersome for
  me was when they began buying all manner of
  sources with knowledge of inner circles, why did
  no one probe about WMD? (See 212, last full
  paragraph.) The CIA operative realized that if
  50 of what they were getting was bullshit they
  still had a goldmine. This would have been a
  good time to return to question their assumptions
  about WMD. Indeed, even before this point they
  had a source, it turned out, who was inside
  Saddams inner circle and he had told them
  earlier Saddams WMD were a feint! Instead, they
  listened to Curveball!

75
Chapter 20

• All about the NSA and a good chapter to read to
  help students understand the debate ongoing over
  Bushs TSPs one is the NSA warrant-less wire
  taps of Americans in America if/when
  communicating to jihadis the second one that may
  or may not have happened is data mining. General
  Hayden who is still a general has been the
  director of the CIA ever since Negroponte moved
  him there from Negropontes first deputy DNI.
  Discuss the TSPs.
• Chapter 21 . . .

76
Chapter 22

• More discussions about inspection (Blix and
  ElBaradei). It turns out they were right as the
  Iraqi Survey Group then the Robb-Silberman WMD
  report discovered but Cheney loathed them and
  feared getting trapped in the morass of the UN
  when action was needed ASAP in his view.

77
Chapter 22

• In his ongoing role as self-appointed special
  examiner of worst-case scenarios, Cheney has
  spent a substantial amount of time since 9/11
  looking at the potential biological weapon threat
  sic to the United States and to U.S. troop
  overseas (237). Note again Cheneys special
  role. In this case, I think it was important that
  someone do that precise thingwhether is should
  have been Cheney or not is arguable given the
  results. The chapter again is presenting why
  the veeps office and others distrusted Blix.
  They ultimately spied on him intensively! It
  happens but once it leaked out later it was
  embarrassing and may hurt the US in future cases
  where the U.S. feints working with U.S.
  inspectors.

78
Chapter 22

• On other hand, everybody at the UN spies on
  everybody else and Blix and others surely knew
  they were being tapped and taped. While Woodward
  isnt specific, it becomes pretty clear phone
  taps and other methods were used more
  interestingly, clearly, a good number of NSA
  resources were directed at Blix. The
  intelligence indicated that Blix was not
  reporting everything and not doing all the things
  he maintained he was doing. Some of the
  principals believed that Blix was a liar. In any
  case it looked like the inspections effort was
  not sufficiently aggressive, would take months
  or longer and was likely doomed to fail (240).
  We know from subsequent newspaper and Woodwards
  State of Denial that some of the principals
  referred to Libby, Cheney, and below them Feith,
  Addington, neoconservatives outside the admin.

79
Chapter 22

• The now infamous slam dunk debacle comes up
  later in the chapter but its fully covered in
  Tenet and you will form your own opinions after
  reading bothnot especially germane to this
  course though an important moment.
• Its important what actually happened but I
  suspect it wont be fully understood for years to
  come. Bush, Cheney, Rice, and possibly others
  will likely write memoirs. At some point the
  weight of evidence will point one way or the
  other.

80
Chapter 22

• Next is the rather surreal situation wherein
  president Bush made the decision to invade and
  how he didnt actually ask NSC principals their
  views. In fact, as Woodward relates later,
  Powell was told a day after Prince Bandar was
  given the word and highly classified maps and
  plans. Its just plain weird and tells us
  something about Bush though Im still not sure
  what precisely at least when others are around
  Bush never revisited decisions once made and . .
  . ? Other than Rice, Bush said he didnt need to
  ask the principals whether they thought he should
  go to war. He knew what Cheney thought, and he
  decided not to ask Powell or Rumsfeld (251 my
  emphasis).

81
Chapter 24

• Bushs rubicon moment (258-260).

82
Chapter 25

• Cheneys view of how Bush made decisions and his
  admiration of it. And why not, there exist at
  least circumstantial evidence that Bush channeled
  Cheney. (262-263). On Saturday, Jan. 11, Cheney
  invited Prince Bandar Saudi ambassador to his
  West Wing office. Rumsfeld and Gen. Richard B.
  Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
  were also there. Sitting on the edge of the
  table in Cheney's office, Myers took out a large
  map labeled TOP SECRET NOFORN. The NOFORN meant
  NO FOREIGN -- classified material not to be seen
  by any foreign nation. (264.) Later You can
  count on this," Rumsfeld said, pointing to the
  map. You can take that to the bank. This is
  going to happen. (265.)

83
Chapter 25

• This is where again Cheney acts quite counter to
  role expectations and demonstrates Cheneys
  unique role. Cheney, who had been quiet as
  usual, replied, "Prince Bandar, once we start,
  Saddam is toast. Its just plain weird that
  Cheney, while showing a foreign national (whether
  friend or not) highly classified plans and maps.
  Then speaking out of turn, effectively speaking
  for Bush!

84
Chapter 25

• Even stranger, Bandar says he must hear this
  from Bush himself before he can tell his leader
  that its for all the marblesSaddam will not be
  allowed to survive no matter what. Cheney
  doesnt seem too bothered that Bandar has just
  told Cheney that the Saudis that they wont take
  Cheneys word for it but only the presidents.

85
Chapter 25

• Even stranger, Bandar says he must hear this
  from Bush himself before he can tell his leader
  that its for all the marblesSaddam will not be
  allowed to survive no matter what. Cheney
  doesnt seem too bothered that Bandar has just
  told Cheney that the Saudis that they wont take
  Cheneys word for it but only the presidents.
• The Bush didnt need Powells permission comment
  at very end of chapter. Again, I think this says
  something about Bush but dont know what for
  certain. Bush seems almost peevish.

86
Chapter 26

• Feith was not popular with uniformed military
  Franks tried to ignore Feith but it was not
  easy. The general confided to several colleagues
  about Feith I have to deal with the fucking
  stupidest guy on the face of the earth almost
  every day (281). The Office of Recostruction and
  Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and why it should
  have never been a DOD entity. (283.) The Future
  of Iraq study and how Powell tried to plant his
  experts inside but was rebuffed by Rumsfeld (read
  Cheney)also discussed in Tenet. (Ibid
  especially Cheneys thinking that too many State
  Department people on the group on 284.)

87
Chapter 27

• Powells view that Cheney had the fever. Powell
  detected a kind of fever in Cheney. He was not
  the steady, unemotional rock that he had
  witnessed a dozen years earlier during the run-up
  to the Gulf War. The vice president was beyond
  hell-bent for action against Hussein. It was as
  if nothing else existed. Powell attempted to
  summarize the consequences of unilateral action,
  an argument he felt he had down pretty well. He
  added a new dimension, saying that the
  international reaction would be so negative that
  he would have to close U.S. embassies around the
  world if we went to war alone (292 and 292-294).

88
Chapter 28

• Blairs desire for another UN resolution and
  Bushs loyalty to Blair. (297.) NSC staffer and
  liaison with DODfiefdoms (321).
  Communications between the civilian and military
  sides of the Defense Department are
  catastrophically broken. . . With personal
  contacts in the Pentagon among the three- and
  four-star generals and admirals, he realized that
  the Joint Staff was afraid of Rumsfeld and Feith
  and did not want to be seen as meddling with
  Franks war plan! (322.) Feiths briefing with
  cherry-picked intelligence to the president and
  the NSC. (328.) Oddly, Ken Adelman a key
  neoconservative, the same person who wrote the
  oped piece Cake Walk in the Wall Street
  Journal, who wrote another titled Give Saddam
  Hussein A Last, Last, Last, Last Chance. (333.)
  Adleman, Perle, and Gingrich as outside-channel
  advisors.

89
Chapter 31

• The early seeds of CPA authority Jerry Paul
  Bremers horrendous decisions to a)
  de-baathification far-too deeply and b) his
  edict to dissolve the Iraqi Military putting tens
  of thousands of Iraqis out of work during 2004
  after Bremer (sponsored by Cheney, Libby, et al.)
  nudged Jay Garner aside. (343.) In retrospect,
  these two decision may have been the two most
  important after the actual decision to invade!

90
Chapter 35

• More bureaucratic turf battles over leaks and
  the CNN effects and how to role out deployment
  while keeping surprise on US side. (389-391.)
  President Bushs solo meeting with Cheney,
  demonstrating once more Cheneys preternatural
  influence over Bush. (391-392.)

91
Epilogue

• Vice President Cheney phoned Adelman, who was in
  Paris with his wife, Carol. What a clever column,
  the vice president said. You really demolished
  them. He said he and his wife, Lynne, were having
  a small private dinner Sunday night, April 13, to
  talk and celebrate. The only other guests would
  be his chief adviser, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby,
  and Wolfowitz, now deputy secretary of defense.
  Adelman realized it was Cheney's way of saying
  thank you, and he and his wife came back from
  Paris a day early to attend the dinner.

92
Epilogue

• When Adelman walked into the vice president's
  residence that Sunday night, he was so happy he
  broke into tears. He hugged Cheney for the first
  time in the 30 years he had known him. There had
  been reports in recent days of mass graves and
  abundant, graphic evidence of torture by Saddam
  Hussein's government, so there was a feeling that
  they had been part of a greater good, liberating
  25 million people.
• We're all together. There should be no
  protocol let's just talk, Cheney said when they
  sat down to dinner.

93
Epilogue

• Hold it! Hold it! Adelman interjected. Let's
  talk about this Gulf war. It's so wonderful to
  celebrate. He said he was just an outside
  adviser, someone who turned up the pressure in
  the public forum. It's so easy for me to write
  an article saying, 'Do this.' It's much tougher
  for Paul to advocate it. Paul and Scooter, you
  give advice inside and the president listens.
  Dick, your advice is the most important, the
  Cadillac. It's much more serious for you to
  advocate it. But in the end, all of what we said
  was still only advice. The president is the one
  who had to decide. I have been blown away by how
  determined he is. The war has been awesome,
  Adelman said. So I just want to make a toast,
  without getting too cheesy. To the president of
  the United States. Stunning!

94
Epilogue

• They all raised their glasses. Hear! Hear!
• Adelman said he had worried to death that there
  would be no war as time went on and support
  seemed to wane.
• After Sept. 11, 2001, Cheney said, the president
  understood what had to be done. He BUSH had to
  do Afghanistan first, sequence the attacks, but
  after Afghanistan"soon thereafter" -- the
  president knew he had to do Iraq. Cheney said he
  was confident after Sept. 11 that it would come
  out okay.

95
Epilogue

• They all raised their glasses. Hear! Hear!
• Adelman said he had worried to death that there
  would be no war as time went on and support
  seemed to wane.
• After Sept. 11, 2001, Cheney said, the president
  understood what had to be done. He BUSH had to
  do Afghanistan first, sequence the attacks, but
  after Afghanistan"soon thereafter" -- the
  president knew he had to do Iraq. Cheney said he
  was confident after Sept. 11 that it would come
  out okay.

96
Epilogue

• Adelman said it was still a gutsy move. When
  John F. Kennedy was elected by the narrowest of
  margins, Adelman said, he told everyone in his
  administration that the big agenda items such as
  civil rights would have to wait for a second
  term. Certainly it was the opposite for Bush.
• Yes, Cheney said. And it began the first minutes
  of the presidency, when Bush said they were going
  to go full steam ahead. There is such a tendency,
  Cheney said, to hold back when there is a close
  election, to do what the New York Times and other
  pundits suggest and predict. "This guy was just
  totally different," Cheney said. "He just decided
  here's what I want to do, and I'm going to do it.
  He's very directed. He's very focused."

97
Epilogue

• "I want you three guys to shut up," Lynne Cheney
  said, pointing at Cheney, Wolfowitz and Adelman.
  "Let's hear what Scooter thinks."
• Libby, smiling, just said he thought what had
  happened was wonderful.

98
Epilogue

• It was a pretty amazing accomplishment, they all
  agreed, particularly given the opposition to war.
  Here was Scowcroft, the pillar of establishment
  foreign policy, vocally on the other side, widely
  seen as a surrogate for the president's father.
  There had been James A. Baker III, the former
  secretary of state, insisting on a larger
  coalition of nations. And Lawrence Eagleburger,
  Baker's successor in the last half year of the
  first Bush administration, on television all the
  time saying war was justified only if there was
  evidence that Hussein was about to attack us.
  Eagleburger had accused Cheney of "chest
  thumping. Again, peevish.

99
Epilogue

• They turned to the current secretary of state,
  Colin L. Powell, and there were chuckles around
  the table.
• Cheney and Wolfowitz remarked that Powell was
  someone who followed his poll ratings and bragged
  about his popularity. Several weeks earlier in a
  National Public Radio interview, Powell had said,
  "If you would consult any recent Gallup poll, the
  American people seem to be quite sa