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An Integrative Principled Approach

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Title: An Integrative Principled Approach


1
An Integrative Principled Approach to Network
Science for Autonomic Networks John S.
Baras Institute for Systems Research University
of Maryland 301-405-6606 baras_at_isr.umd.edu N
etwork Science Workshop August 31-September 1,
2006 Athens, Greece
2
Autonomous Swarms
3
Outline
  • Networks
  • Constrained Coalitional Games
  • Iterative Dynamics on Graphs
  • Trust-Reputation-Profiling
  • Direct and Indirect Trust Computation
  • Component Based Networking
  • Network Design and Trade-offs

4
What is a Network?
  • A collection of nodes, agents,
  • that collaborate to accomplish actions, gains,
  • that cannot be accomplished with out such
    collaboration
  • Most significant concept for autonomous, or
    autonomic networks

5
The Fundamental Trade-off
  • The nodes gain from collaborating
  • To collaborate they need to communicate, and this
    represents cost
  • Trade-off gain from collaboration vs cost
  • Multiple metrics involved
    typically
  • Many problems in communication networks, sensor
    networks, economic networks, social networks,
    biological networks, can be traced to this key
    trade off

6
Modeling Communication Patterns
  • What form communications take?
  • How are they represented?
  • How are costs generated?
  • How connectivity is controlled?
  • Does agent behavior influence connectivity?
  • Communication patterns for learning.
  • Connectivity can be physical, or logical
    (relational)
  • Links-graphs, neighborhoods, MRF, etc

7
Example Cooperation in MANET
  • Almost all functionalities
  • Emergent properties based on local interactions
    and information
  • Cooperative comms process overheard info
    spatial diversity
  • Cooperation games - dimensioning

8
Outline
  • Networks
  • Constrained Coalitional Games
  • Iterative Dynamics on Graphs
  • Trust and Collaboration
  • Direct and Indirect Trust Computation
  • Component Based Networking
  • Network Design and Trade-offs

9
Cooperative Games
  • Cooperative Game in characteristic function form
    G N, v, N 1, 2, , N, v 2N?R , on
    all subsets S (coalitions) of N
  • S a coalition, v(S ) is interpreted as the
    maximum utility S can get without the
    cooperation of players in N \ S
  • S a coalition, vS is the restriction of v to
    the player set S
  • vS (T ) v(S ) for each T ? S
  • S , vS a subgame of the game N, v
  • G superadditive S, T ? N, S ?T ?, v(S ? T )
    ? v(S ) v(T )
  • G monotone S ? T implies v(S ) ? v(T )

10
Cooperative Games and Payoffs
  • Feasible payoff vectors
  • Efficient payoff vectors
  • Individually rational payoff vectors
  • Imputation set Set of all individually rational
    and efficient payoffs
  • Solution s associates with each game G a
    subset of I(N, v) Can be
    characterized either by math relations or axioms
    Helps capture different notions of desirable
    properties of solutions
  • x dominates y through coalition S (x ?S y) if
    xi gt yi, i?S, x(S) ? v(S)
  • x dominates y (x ? y) if x ?S y for some
    coalition S

11
Cooperative Games
  • G convex for each i?N, S ? T, implies di(S )
    ? di(T )
  • increasing marginal
  • returns contribution of I
  • G rational v(N ) ? ?iv(i)

12
Cooperative Games Solution Concepts
  • Core (stable, reasonable payoffs) gives each
    coalition at least as much as could get by itself
  • Convex and average convex games have nonempty
    cores
  • For a set of games the core is the unique
    solution that is individually rational,
    superadditive, nonempty and satisfies the reduced
    game property
  • Two interpretations of the core C(N, v)
  • All imputations such that no group of players has
    an inventive to split off from the grand
    coalition N and form a smaller coalition S
  • No group of players gets more than what they
    collectively add to the value obtainable by the
    grand coalition N
  • C(N, v) is nonempty iff N, v is balanced

13
Cooperative Games Solution Concepts
  • Stable sets V? I , there is no x, y ?V s.t. x?y,
    and if y?V, there is x?V s.t. x?y
  • Nucleolus excess e(S, x) v(S ) x(S )
    measure of dissatisfaction
    of coalition S for payoff x Set
    ?(x) (e(S, x))S ?N solution obtained by
    min ?(?(x)) x ? I(N, v).
    Minimize maximal complaint.
  • The Nucleolus is always in the core

14
Cooperative Games Solution Concepts
  • Nucleolus is the individually rational payoff
    that lexicographically minimizes the excess
    vector
  • Leads to iterative procedure for getting there
  • Use a small set of linear programs that
    iteratively minimize the highest excess, then the
    second highest excess, etc.
  • A solution concept is the Nucleolus if and only
    if it is anonymous (ind. of payer labeling),
    covariant (ind. of scale expressing preferences),
    satisfies the reduced game property
  • Shapley Value solution ? with components the
    expected marginal contribution made by i when
    entering coalition N
  • T is a carrier, if v(S ) v(S ?T), v(S ) ?i?S
    ?i (v). Shapley Value is the unique solution
    that has this property, is anonymous and
    additive
  • For convex games Shapley Value is in the core
  • Kernel, Bargaining Set consider coalition
    structures, their stability, objections and
    counterobjections

15
Networks and Constraints
All coalitions cannot be formed To coordinate
(collaborate) agents need to communicate Network
(N, L) Edges links between payers i and j
directly connected i and j path
connected Cooperation components Links between
players in S , L(S ) Network (S , L(S ))
induces a partition of S Cycle Free and Cycle
Complete networks Wheels
16
Constrained Coalitions
  • Network-restricted cooperation game or
    constrained coalition N, vL
  • N, v, L communication situation
  • Characteristic function
  • Myerson value Shapley value of N, vL
  • Component decomposability, component efficiency,
    fairness

17
Network Formation
  • Form links pairwise
  • Iterative game
  • Better understanding of topologies dynamics
    topology control
  • Network formation with costs for establishing
    links
  • N, v, L, c N, v L,c
  • Stability vs efficiency of the resulting network
  • Small world graphs

18
Outline
  • Networks
  • Constrained Coalitional Games
  • Iterative Dynamics on Graphs
  • Trust and Collaboration
  • Direct and Indirect Trust Computation
  • Component Based Networking
  • Network Design and Trade-offs

19
Example Trust Management System
Prior trust relations
Trust Decision
Trust Credential
Credential Distribution
Evaluation Policy
Local observations
Local key exchanges
Applications
20
Trust Evaluation in Autonomic Networks
  • The network is modeled as a directed graph G(V,E)
  • G is the trust graph
  • A directed link from node i to node j corresponds
    to the trust relation i has on j
  • The weight cij represents the opinion of i on j,
  • Trust evaluation is to estimate the
    trustworthiness of nodes
  • ti represents node i being either GOOD or BAD,
    denoted as ti1 or -1
  • si is the estimated trust value of node i
  • si is a subjective concept, while ti is an
    existing but unknown fact
  • Objective to drive si as close to ti as possible
    based on available Jij

21
Local Voting Rule
  • In homogenous networks, the trustworthiness of an
    agent is based on other peers opinion
  • The most straightforward scheme is to ask
    neighbors to vote for it
  • Values of the votes are equal to cij
  • Iterative voting rule
  • Evaluation starts from a small set of trusted
    nodes
  • Our interest is to study evolution of the
    estimated trust value si and its property at the
    equilibrium

22
Trust Dynamics
  • Trust spreading

Initial islands of trusts
  • Trust revocation
  • Changes in topology, membership, secure paths
  • Referees of a node may change, trust evidence for
    a node may change
  • Votes timeout or negative votes

23
Deterministic Voting Rule
  • We use the weighted average as the voting rule,
    where weights are vote values (all quantities
    nonnegative)
  • is the degree of node i
  • n represents discrete time
  • Assume is a constant, i.e. it doesnt
    change with time, which is true when considering
    the steady state
  • The voting rule can be written in system
    equation

24
Voting with Headers
  • We introduce the notion of headers
  • Headers are pre-trusted agents and only vote for
    nodes that they fully trust.
  • If node i is trusted with bi headers, it gets
    bi more votes with value 1. Let B diagb1 , b2
    ,, bN .
  • The system equation changes to
  • Convergence
  • Theorem Given a virtuous network, in order to
    have a trust connected graph, the number of
    headers of each node must satisfy
  • This theorem proves, as well as provides, a
    network design method to establish a fully
    trusted network by introducing headers

25
Stochastic Threshold Rule
  • Stochastic threshold rule with uncertainty
    parameter b
  • Where
  • Update sequence random asynchronous updates
  • Difficult to achieve synchronicity in autonomic
    networks
  • The probability that node i is chosen as the
    target at each iteration is fixed as qi

Zi(k) is the normalization factor
26
Convergence
  • The steady state can be derived using the Markov
    chain
  • If and ,
    the voting rule converges to the steady state
    with a unique stationary distribution
  • The unique stationary distribution is
  • where
  • and Z is the normalization function
  • Criterion probability of correct estimation

27
Trust in Virtuous Networks
All nodes are good and have full confidence in
their neighbors. We study Pcorrect at steady
state.
Left figure The threshold should be less or
equal to 0, otherwise the trust estimate of each
node converges to -1. Right figure When
threshold is equal to 0 -- phase transition.
Small change on the parameter results in opposite
performance of the voting rule.
28
Virtuous Networks with Uncertainty
  • All nodes are good, but because of uncertainty
    and incompleteness, Jijs are random variables
  • Assume
  • Assume that the probability of a good node having
    an incorrect opinion on its neighbors is pe
  • Simulation results
  • When pe is larger, the system more probably stays
    in the random phase.
  • When pe is large enough (pe gt 0.15), the system
    always stays in the random phase.
  • Theoretical analysis replica method in spin
    glasses

29
Network Topology
  • Random Graph (Erdös and Rényi, 1960)
  • Nodes link to each other randomly
  • Small-world model (Watts Strogatz,1998)
  • Short average distance (six degree of separation)
  • Large clustering coefficient
  • Scale-free model (Barabási Albert, 1999)
  • The distribution of degrees follows the power law
  • Existence of hubs
  • Rich get richer
  • Recent research discovered lots of complex
    networks being scale-free

30
Spreading Speed and Topology
  • The time for updating rule to reach steady state,
    i.e., how fast the trust values converge.
  • Perron-Frobenius Theorem in algebraic graph
    theory For a stochastic matrix A
  • is the largest eigenvalue of A, which is 1
    and is the second largest eigenvalue of
    A.
  • The convergence rate of An is of order
  • Normalized adjacency matrices are stochastic
    matrices, therefore those with smaller
    converge faster.
  • What kind of networks or which network topology
    has smaller second largest eigenvalue

31
Network Topology and Deterministic Voting Rule
  • We consider the F small-world model proposed by
    Watts and Strogatz
  • High clustering coefficient and small average
    graphical distance between any pair.
  • We use F-model, which is modeled by adding small
    number of new edges into a regular lattice.
  • Adding just 1 more edges, spreading finishes in
    10 times less rounds.

32
Network Topology and Stochastic Voting Rule
  • B Small-world model
  • Prw represents short cuts fraction on a regular
    lattice
  • Regular lattice Prw0 Random graph Prw1
  • Prw in 0.1,0.01 is the area for the small world
    model
  • The performance of the voting rule increases as
    Prw increases.
  • A more random graph has shorter average distance
  • Accuracy of trust information degenerates over
    the path length, so a short spreading path has
    more accurate information and leads to good result

33
Outline
  • Networks
  • Constrained Coalitional Games
  • Iterative Dynamics on Graphs
  • Trust and Collaboration
  • Direct and Indirect Trust Computation
  • Component Based Networking
  • Network Design and Trade-offs

34
Ising and Spin Glass Models
  • Statistical Physics models for magnetization
  • Orientation of each particles spin depends on
    its neighbors
  • Ising Model behavior of simple magnets
  • Spin Glass Model complex materials
  • Math interpretation
  • s s1, s2,, sn is a configuration of n
    particle spins, where sj 1 or -1 , spin j
    is up or down
  • Energy for configuration s
  • Ising Model Jij J for all i, j
  • Spin Glass Model Jij depend on i,j and can be
    random

35
Ising/SG Models and Games
  • Ising/SG models can be interpreted as dynamic
    (repeated) games
  • The value of si represents whether node i is
    willing to cooperate or not
  • each particle selects spin to maximize its own
    payoff
  • Ising model (Jij Jgt0) align its spin with the
    majority of neighbors spin
  • High T, conservative agents, not willing to
    change, small payoffs
  • Low T, aggressive agents, larger payoffs
  • Collection of local decisions reduces the total
    energy of the interacting particles
  • Inspires an approach where trust is an incentive
    for cooperation
  • Jij can be interpreted as the worth of player j
    to player i
  • decide to cooperate or not based on benefit from
    cooperation and trust values of neighbors

36
Statistical Mechanics of Spin Glasses
  • Statistical Mechanics primary object of interest
  • Recent excitement computation of ground state,
    partition function Z, NP - complete, Replica
    Method
  • Application and extensions to several well known
    problems turbocodes, image restoration, neural
    networks, learning, associative memory, SAT,
    knapsack, SA, number parttioning, graph
    partitioning, CDMA, MIMO,

37
Spin Glass Cooperative Game
  • Spin glass model as a cooperative game (spin
    glass game)
  • S ? N 1, 2, , n is a coalition, in which
    all nodes cooperate
  • Interaction topology (Jijs) moderates effects
    pos. and neg. feedback
  • v(S) value of the characteristic function of
    the game , v 2N?R, which is the maximum payoff S
    can get without cooperation from other nodes N
    /S.
  • The cooperative game is denoted as G (N, v)
  • Object to find what form or policy for Jij
    can induce all (or most) nodes to cooperate
    maximize the coalition

38
Cooperation and Games
  • In autonomic networks
  • Cooperation is restricted to only local
    interactions
  • Decision is made by each node individually
  • Nodes are self-interested
  • Explain and analyze emergent properties
  • Game theoretic methods
  • Provide a framework for modeling individual
    interactions
  • Understand complex global structures and dynamics
    of a system composed of a large number of agents
    with simple local interactions
  • Guide for analytical approach
  • Examples Ising spin glass models, prisoners
    dilemma
  • Goal how to encourage nodes to collaborate in
    games?
  • Incentive trust systems to promote cooperation
    and circumvent misbehaving nodes.

39
Trust as Mechanism to Induce Collaboration
Profiling--Reputation
  • Trust is an incentive for collaboration
  • Nodes who refrain from cooperation get lower
    trust values
  • They will be eventually penalized because other
    nodes tend to only cooperate with highly trusted
    ones.
  • Assume, for node i, that the loss for not
    cooperating with node j is a nondecreasing
    function of Jji as f (Jji), and the new
    characteristic function is
  • Theorem if ,
    the core is nonempty and
  • is a feasible payoff
    allocation in the core.
  • By introducing a trust mechanism, all nodes are
    induced to collaborate without any negotiation

40
Dynamic Coalition Formation
  • System model
  • Two linked dynamics
  • Trust propagation
  • Game evolution
  • Stability of dynamic coalition
  • Nash equilibrium no node will gain if it changes
    its current strategy, while others keep unchanged.

41
Results of Game Evolution
  • Theorem
    , there exists t0, such that for a
    reestablishing period t gt t0
  • The iterated game converges to Nash equilibrium
  • In the Nash equilibrium, all nodes cooperate with
    all their neighbors.
  • Comparison of games with (without) trust
    mechanism, strategy update

Percentage of cooperating pairs vs negative links
Average payoffs vs negative links
42
Outline
  • Networks
  • Constrained Coalitional Games
  • Iterative Dynamics on Graphs
  • Trust and Collaboration
  • Direct and Indirect Trust Computation
  • Component Based Networking
  • Network Design and Trade-offs

43
Example Direct Network Trust
  • Direct trust is based on past interactions
    between User A and User B.
  • It is As belief about Bs future behavior.
  • Helps A decide for himself and based on local
    information what to do next.

A
B
44
Example Indirect Network Trust
User 8 asks for access to User 1s files.User 1
and User 8 have no previous interaction
What should User 1 do?
2
1
7
Use transitivity of trust (i.e. use references)
4
6
3
5
8
45
Direct Trust
  • User i
  • is of type ti?Good, Bad
  • chooses action ai?C,D, i1N
  • receives payoff RiR(ai,a?(i),ti)
  • wants to maximize his own payoff (local behavior)

46
Direct Trust
  • Questions we are investigating
  • How can collaboration of Good nodes be achieved?
  • Maximization of the Good node payoff
  • How quickly can it be achieved?
  • Repeated interactions
  • How many bad nodes can destroy it?
  • Within our framework, the following parameters
    affect the answers to the above questions.
  • Payoffs
  • Strategies
  • Topology

47
Direct Trust
  • Prior probability (reputation, profiling) for
    user types
  • Bayes-Nash equilibrium
  • Strategy for User i

evolving reputation
48
Direct Trust
  • Two sequences evolving with time
  • Vector of actions (strategies), time 1n
  • Set of vectors of neighbor probabilities
    (reputations), time 1n

49
Example Direct Trust -- Learning
  • Where is trust in all this?
  • RememberDirect trust is based on past
    interactions between User A and User B.It is As
    belief about Bs future behavior.Helps A decide
    what to do next.
  • Trust is how users use the history of past
    actions to decide what to do next.
  • Quantified with updated probabilities
    (reputations) pi.

50
Semirings-Definitions
  • ? is used to combine edge weights along a
    path
  • ? is used to combine path weights

a
a?b
b
51
Trust Semiring PropertiesPartial Order
  • Combined along-a-path weight should not increase
  • Combined across-paths weight should not decrease

a
b
2
3
1
a
b
52
Semirings-Examples
  • Shortest Path Problem
  • Semiring
  • ? is and computes total path delay
  • ? is and picks shortest path
  • Bottleneck Problem
  • Semiring
  • ? is and computes path bandwidth
  • ? is and picks highest bandwidth

53
Computing Indirect Trust
2
1
7
4
6
3
5
8
54
Trust Path Semiring
  • 0 ? trust, confidence ? 1
  • ? is
  • ? is

55
Computing Indirect Trust
  • Path interpretation
  • Linear system interpretation

Indicator vector of pre-trusted nodes
56
Computing Indirect Trust
  • Treat as a linear system
  • We are looking for its steady state.
  • Benefits
  • Result of computation linked explicitly to
    properties of matrix W
  • Easier to see effect of attacks, of pre-trusted
    nodes, of changes in the topology (manipulation
    of W).
  • Speed of convergence linked to circuits of W.

57
Attacker
  • The Attacker wants to change the opinion of a
    node s for a node d as much as possible.
  • Similar to The Attacker wants to change the
    distance (path length) from a node s to a node d
    as much as possible.
  • Similar to The Attacker wants to change the
    capacity (throughput) from a node s to a node d
    as much as possible.

58
Most Vital Edge
  • In all cases, the Attacker attacks a single edge,
    called the Most Vital Edge.
  • All that changes is the semiring and the
    interpretation of the weights.
  • Ramaswamy, Orlin, and Chakravarti found two
    different characterizations of the Most Vital
    Edge for the (min,) and the (max,min) semiring.
  • Is there a unified characterization?

59
Edge Tolerances
  • Upper (Lower) edge tolerance of an edge e, w.r.t.
    an optimal path p, is the highest (lowest)
    weight of e that would preserve the optimality of
    p.
  • In a shortest path problem (min, ), the most
    vital edge is the path edge whose weight has the
    largest difference with the upper tolerance.
  • In a maximum capacity problem (max, min), the
    most vital edge is the path edge whose weight has
    the largest difference with the lower tolerance.

60
Upper Tolerance Example
  • Upper Tolerances for the Shortest Path Problem

4
2
Upper Tolerances
6
6
5
5
Shortest Path
1
3
5
1
10
61
Lower Tolerance Example
  • Lower Tolerances for the Shortest Path Problem

4
2
Lower Tolerances
6
6
5
5
Shortest Path
1
3
5
1
10
62
Attacked Edge on the Path
Trust Edge Attack
2
1
7
New Optimal Path p, trust value t
4
RESULT Decrease Trust!
6
3
5
8
Optimal Path p, trust value t
63
Attacked Edge not on the Path
Trust Edge Attack
2
1
7
New Optimal Path p, trust value t
RESULTIncrease Trust!Change Path!
4
6
3
5
8
Optimal Path p, trust value t
64
Tolerances for any Optimization Semiring
  • Optimization semirings ? is min or max
  • ?-minimal (maximal) tolerance ae (ße) of edge e
    instead of lower (upper) tolerance.
  • ? is the inverse of ? defined by a ? x b ? x
    b ? a
  • w(e) is the weight of edge e. w(p) is the weight
    of path p.
  • If e ? p
  • If e ? p

65
Tolerances for the Trust Semiring
  • Assume (max, ) semiring essentially equivalent
    to our trust semiring.
  • Tolerances
  • If e ? p
  • If e ? p

66
Outline
  • Networks
  • Constrained Coalitional Games
  • Iterative Dynamics on Graphs
  • Trust and Collaboration
  • Direct and Indirect Trust Computation
  • Component Based Networking
  • Network Design and Trade-offs

67
Component Based Networking (CBN)
  • MANETs are complex engineering systems composed
    of many heterogeneous hardware and software
    components
  • It is our fundamental view that MANET must be
    viewed as distributed, asynchronous and hybrid
    dynamic systems
  • They should be regarded as systems of subsystems
    that sense, make decisions and execute actions
    ---- as closed-loop systems
  • The subsystems that perform this sensing or
    decision making or action execution (be they
    single nodes or collections of nodes) are not
    co-located
  • As a result communications occur between sensing
    blocks, decision making blocks and action
    execution blocks that are subject to greatly
    varying constraints on communication bandwidth
    and delay
  • This distributed asynchronous dynamic systems
    view of MANETs has not been promoted to date
  • It is essential, in our view, for understanding
    fundamental architectural issues and issues such
    as stability and robustness, and performance vs
    complexity trade-offs, and it leads to new
    fundamental rethinking of the analytical
    foundations for dynamic collaboration (between
    nodes and/or subsets of nodes) subject to the
    constraints of distributed operation,
    asynchronous operation, bandwidth, delay.

68
MANET as Distributed Hybrid Systems
  • Our long term approach will utilize a mixture of
    methods from computer science (distributed
    communicating processes, formal models, formal
    verification-validation) and from
    control-communication systems (hybrid systems,
    multi-agent systems, feedback, system dynamics
    and stability).
  • We are developing formal dynamic models for MANET
    that respect the constraints, while at the same
    time formally specifying the structure (what the
    network consists of?) and behavior (what the
    network does?) of a MANET as a system from a
    systems engineering perspective.
  • It is within this framework that distributed and
    asynchronous operation will be built in as
    constraints (logical or numerical), and where
    bandwidth and delay constraints between sensing,
    decision making and action execution blocks will
    also be modeled.
  • To completely model and understand properties of
    MANET we need a framework that combines logical
    and numerical models, thus hybrid systems.

69
Component-Based System Synthesis Process
Model-based Beyond UML Rapsody UPPAAL
Artist Tools MATLAB, MAPLE Modelica DOORS,
etc OPCAD CPLEX, SOLVER, ILOG
Integrated System Synthesis Tools - Environments
missing
Generate derivative requirements metrics
Model-Based Information-Centric Abstractions
Integrated Multiple Views is Hard !
70
System Synthesis and Integration is the Next
Frontier
  • From a Reductionist Approach to an Integrative
    Approach
  • The challenge is to generate system predictable
    behavior by integrating behaviors of the
    components
  • It is not all in the software environments
  • Need a combination of
  • Model-Based system and software design and
    integration (software tools environments)
  • and
  • Deeper analysis of underlying abstractions and
    models and their properties

71
Model-Based Integration Software Environments
Needs
  • Domain Specific Modeling Languages (DSML) with
    semantics that can be composed and manipulated
  • Composition platforms ? correct by construction
    systems platforms and models of computations
    substantial reduction in VV
  • System and component behavioral abstractions that
    can support Incremental System Integration ?
    while preserving testability and predictability
  • Fully integrated semantically control, software
    and systems design tools and platforms

72
Deeper Analysis of System Models and Properties
Needs
  • Principles for system integration ? System
    Science ? Network Science
  • Fundamental performance limitations of networked
    systems ? implementation technology free
  • Fundamental performance limitations of
    distributed asynchronous systems, with
    concurrency constraints, with non-collocated
    sensors, decision making and actuation nodes,
    with multiple feedback loops, with delay and
    bandwidth constraints
  • Distributed control of and inference in the same
  • Theories of compositionality
  • Much better integration of logic and optimization
    for trade-off analysis in dynamical systems

73
Current Autonomic Wireless Nets Performance Very
Poor
From Tim Krout
74
Overhead (OH) vs Performance
From Ananthram Swami
75
Cross-Linked Executable, Formal and Performance
Models for MANET Protocols
76
Cross-Linked Models
  • Executable system models (ESM) utilize modern
    software engineering methodologies to develop
    object-oriented and component-based models of
    sensor networks, utilizing UML2 and other
    advanced software systems.
  • From these models automatic generation of
    executable code for all elements of a MANET is
    possible for either simulation or field tests.
    Embedded in these models are semantics of the
    operation and composition of the various
    components.
  • Formal system models (FSM) of MANET protocols are
    based on communicating extended finite state
    machines (deterministic or stochastic) (CEFSM) or
    on colored timed Petri nets (deterministic or
    stochastic) (CTPN). They are linked with the
    executable models via bisimulation relationships,
    and typically correspond to approximations of the
    executable models by emphasizing timing behavior
    of the modeled system in a timed automata sense.
  • Performance system models (PSM) of MANET and
    MANET protocols are based on various approximate
    dynamic system model frameworks (queuing systems,
    differential equations and fluid flow, difference
    equations, discrete event systems) together with
    performance metrics (or utilities) that can be
    evaluated using the models either analytically or
    by efficient numerical schemes.
  • Performance models are linked to executable
    models via bisimulation relationships, and
    typically correspond to approximations of the
    executable models emphasizing performance and
    quality of service metrics computation or bounds.
  • Performance models are also linked to Formal
    models via bisimulation relationships and
    critical event correspondence.

77
Cross-Linked Models
  • This is already a substantial extension from the
    software engineering work.
  • A further and substantial extension is that we
    will develop a formal compositional (or component
    based) version of this approach.
  • This includes development of semantics for
    linking components of MANET protocols and of
    MANET, including the associated theories of
    components and compositionality. This,
    methodology and framework is in itself an
    important contribution to network science.
  • It is this specific framework and underlying
    mathematical methodologies that we utilize to
    describe, model and evaluate the structure of
    MANET (including network structure and network
    architecture) versus multi-criteria (multiple
    metrics) performance.
  • This represents a uniquely innovative departure
    from the current state of the art in MANET
    investigations that focus almost entirely on
    network behavior (i.e. the dynamics of the
    algorithms for network operation).
  • Our framework allows us to investigate the design
    of both structure and operation (i.e. behavior)
    within a well integrated framework.

78
Cross Linked Models
  • A very significant and unique feature of our
    approach is that we will be able to check
    correctness of functionality as well as
    performance of the MANET protocol or MANET or its
    components.
  • Furthermore and most significantly the proposed
    approach and framework allows the automation (to
    a large degree) of the validation, verification
    and testing of the MANET protocol and of the
    MANET design and operation.
  • This is our vision and long term research in this
    area.
  • Among other things it represents a truly
    innovative and fundamental contribution to
    Network Science.

79
Current State of MANET Routing the Need for
Component Based Routing
  • Formal methods and models hardly used ? lack of
    systematic analysis of correctness and proof of
    properties
  • Evaluation predominantly done by simulations
  • Limited knowledge as to specific relations
    between parts and parameters of the protocol and
    performance
  • Ad hoc approach to cross-layer design
  • Very limited consideration of trade offs between
    performance reliability security
  • Problems from conventional layering
    inflexibility, inefficiency, side-effects
  • Conventional layers create time, energy, OH
    inefficiencies especially for MANET (Jung and
    Biersack 2000)

80
CBR What is it? What are the Goals?CBN
  • Not a single routing protocol, but a collection
    of elementary modules that can be combined to
    form routing protocols with various capabilities,
    limitations, efficiency, and a synthesis
    environment to meet requirements
  • Heterogeneous wireless communication networks ?
    very large and complex software systems ? Model
    and Component Based Software Engineering
  • Routing protocols have special needs and
    requirements, such as loopfreeness, etc, examples
    of formal model requirements
  • Longer term vision
  • new and powerful methodology for cross-layer
    design, that examines layers from the fundamental
    perspective of components / compositions
  • component based networking (CBN) ? scientific
    foundation for systems of systems (networks of
    networks) synthesis problems
  • Basic research problem develop this systems
    engineering or component based analysis and
    synthesis subject to various formal model
    constraints

81
Can Components be Determined Formally?
  • Explicit interfaces are fundamental for
    components make explicit all the means for
    communication and coordination of components
  • Requires a much stronger notion of interface than
    is common in OO models or model based software
  • Component-based systems ? behavioral
    specifications integrated into component
    interfaces are important ? need to go beyond EFSM
    and CEFSM
  • Model-based generators of component adaptors
  • Semantic foundations of architectural and
    component-based design within UML
  • Compositional techniques for the analysis of
    embedded and real-time systems in UML
  • Compositional model checking of UML behavioral
    models ? Statecharts

82
Formal Methods Network Protocols
  • Protocols set of rules, syntax, semantics
  • Network Protocols Specification, Verification,
    Monitoring
  • Reason about Network Routing Protocols
  • Formal methods allow to check
  • if protocol is working properly
  • if implementation is correct
  • do devices deviate from protocol standard, etc
  • SPIN, UPPAAL, Esterel, etc
  • Bhargavan et al, 2002, formal models for
    DSDV-AODV
  • Yang and Baras 2002-2003, formal model for TORA
  • Yang and Baras 2005-2006, automated Vulnerability
    Analysis of MANET routing protocols

83
Modularity of Routing Protocols
  • All MANET routing protocols studied (AODV, DSR,
    OLSR, TORA, ) can be modularized into four
    functional components
  • Route Discovery Component how to search path
    from source to the desired destination by RREQ,
    RREP message or by link state advertisement.
  • Route Maintenance Component how to propagate the
    information of a broken link once its detected
    by Topology Database Maintenance Component, how
    to delete the routing paths cached which contain
    the broken link.
  • Data Packet Forwarding Component how to relay
    data packets from source node to destination node
    by routing paths (hops) cached.
  • Topology Database Maintenance Component how to
    detect the local connectivity when its up or
    down.

84
Subcomponents for AODV
  • AODV
  • Route Discovery Component Subcomponents
  • Expanding_ring RREQs TTL incremented by
    TTL_increment in each retransmission for
    RREQ_timeout.
  • Hop_defined Hops traversed by RREQ arent
    encapsulated into packet. Next hop is stored in
    Route_Cache_Table.
  • Cached_RREP Intermediate node on RREQs path
    can initiate RREP.
  • Route Maintenance Component Subcomponents
  • Local_connectivity_update Use overheard packet
    to update Local_Connectivity_Table.
  • Local_repair Intermediate node on data packets
    path can initiate Route Discovery Procedure.
  • Route_error_disseminate notify hosts
    implementing unreachable nodes as routing hop to
    delete the entry.
  • Packet Forwarding Component Subcomponents
  • Hop_based Look up next routing hop in each
    intermediate nodes Route_Cache_Table.
  • Unsolicited_forwarding Forward data packet
    without waiting for Ack from the receiver hop.
  • Topology Database Maintenance Component
    Subcomponents
  • Hello_detection Period beacon message to
    confirm the existence of the neighboring node.

85
Subcomponents for DSR
  • DSR
  • Route Discovery Component Subcomponents
  • Fixed_ring RREQs TTL is a fixed value.
  • Path_defined Hops traversed by RREQ are
    encapsulated into packet. Routing path is stored
    in Route_Cache_Table.
  • Cached_RREP Intermediate node on RREQs path
    can initiate RREP.
  • Route Maintenance Component Subcomponents
  • Packet_salvage In multipath Route_Cache_Table,
    another path can substitute current broken path.
  • Route_Error notify hosts implementing
    unreachable nodes as routing hop to delete the
    entry.
  • Packet Forwarding Component Subcomponents
  • SourcePath_based Data Packet follows the
    sequence of hops defined by source node, and
    dont look up routes at intermediate nodes.
  • Topology Database Maintenance Component
    Subcomponents
  • Solicited_forwarding Each sender of data packet
    (source node and intermediate node) will wait for
    ACK from the receiver hop, and make a copy of the
    data packet in Maintenance_Buffer. The data
    packet will be retransmitted without receiving
    ACK before Maintenance_timeout.

86
Description of Components using UML2
  • Class and Object Diagrams
  • Describe the physical structure of the protocol
  • Activity and Sequence Diagrams
  • Represent behavior models of each component
  • Mapping of behavior diagrams to structure
  • Helps to identify interfaces needed for plug and
    play components

87
Description of AODV Components
  • Route Discovery
  • Expanding ring search
  • Hop-based
  • Sequence numbers maintenance
  • Route Maintenance
  • Local connectivity update
  • Local repair
  • Route error disseminate
  • Sequence numbers maintenance
  • Packet Forwarding
  • Hop-based
  • Unsolicited forwarding
  • Topology Database Maintenance
  • Hello messaging

88
AODV Structure
89
Route Discovery Behavior Model
Description When the Intermediate Node receives
RREQ or RREP it initiates its own Route Discovery
Process
90
Packet Forwarding Behavior Model
Description This component forwards data
packets in a hop-by-hop manner. Drops the
packets if there is no valid route. Performs
unsolicited forwarding. Does not wait for a
reply from the next-hop in order to send the
packet.
91
Topology Database Maintenance
Description This component describes the
current topology of the network. Each node
knows if it is connected to its neighbors by
sending out periodic Hello Messages. It also
knows if a link has been broken when it receives
a Hello Message but nothing else happens.
92
Component Relationships
Route Discovery
NODE
Route Maintenance
Topology Database Maintenance
LINK
Packet Forwarding
Routing Protocol
93
Routing Protocol Metrics vs Component
Derivative Metrics
  • Goal Evaluate the components against relevant
    metrics that will not only differentiate the
    various components but will also relate the
    performance of the component with the routing
    protocol performance.
  • Also link to other layer metrics (e.g. MAC)
  • Derivative Metrics
  • Route discovery latency (sec)
  • Route discovery overhead (packets/sec)
  • Number of routes found and ranking
  • Quality of the routes (stability, E2E rate delay
    loss)

94
Performance Metrics for Routing Components
  • Component selection how to evaluate and compare
    different components under different environments
    (Network topology, Traffic scenario, Mobility
    profile, Link states)?
  • Meaningful Component Metrics are crucial for
    components performance evaluation, comparison,
    selection
  • Finer metrics than System Performance Metrics
    (Latency, Throughput, Packet Loss Ratio)
  • Statistics can be collected during network
    activities

95
Performance Metrics for Routing Components (cont)
  • Route Discovery Component Metrics
  • 1. Percentage of Route Discovery Failure
    (DPDF)
  • RREQ Unreplied / Total RREQ Initialized
  • 2. Route Discovery Inefficiency Ratio (DOIR)
  • Total Routing Discovery Traffic Rcvd /
    RREQ Replied
  • 3. Percentage of Route Cache Hit for High
    Layer Data Packet (DPCH)
  • Cache Hit Data Packet from High Layer /
    Total Data Packet from High Layer
  • 4. Percentage of Cached RREP (DPCR)
  • Cached RREP Generated/ Total RREP
    Generated
  • 5. Average Delay for Route Discovery (DDRD)
  • Accumulated Delay Time / RREQ Replied
  • Topology Database Maintenance Component Metrics
  • 1. Overhead of Topology Database Maintenance
    (TODM)
  • Total Control Packet Traffic Introduced
    by Topology Database Maintenance /
  • Data Packet Reaching Destination

96
Performance Metrics for Routing Components (cont)
  • Route Maintenance Component Metrics
  • Percentage of Data Packet Reaching Destination
    Aided by Route Maintenance (MPDA)
  • Data Packet Reaching Destination Aided by
    Route Maintenance / Data Packet Reaching
    Destination
  • 2. Average Overhead of Route Maintenance (MORM)
  • Total Control Traffic Introduced by Route
    Maintenance / Data Packet Reaching Destination
    Aided by Route Maintenance
  • 3. Percentage of Route Maintenance Success
    (MPMS)
  • Data Packet Reaching Destination Aided by
    Route Maintenance / Data Packet Attempting
    Route Maintenance
  • Packet Forwarding Component Metrics
  • Percentage of Failed Forwarding (FPFF)
  • Failed Data Packet Forwarding between hops/
    Data Packet Forwarding between hops
  • 2. Percentage of Failed Forwarding Detected by
    Soliciting Data Packet Forwarding (FPFD)
  • Detection of Failed Data Packet Forwarding
    between hops / Failed Data Packet Forwarding
    between hops
  • 3. Average End to End Delay for Packet Forwarding
    (FDPF)
  • Accumulated End to End Delay / End to End Data
    Packet Forwarding

97
Performance of ComponentsRoute Discovery
  • Four instantiations
  • TTL based flooding nexthop storage (AODV like)
  • TTL based flooding path storage
  • Network flooding nexthop storage
  • Network flooding path storage (DSR like)
  • Metrics (key to evaluating components)
  • Path Discovery Failure, Path Discovery Overhead
    (Efficiency)
  • Impact of cached routes (data pkt cache hit, RREP
    generated by cache)
  • Quality of paths (avg hops, avg src-dst
    connectivity )
  • Path Discovery Latency

98
Performance of Components Route Discovery
(cont)
  • Simulation setup
  • - 100 nodes move in area 5x5 km
  • - Mobility Model Random way point, mobility
  • speed varied at 0, 25, 50, 75 and 100
  • meters/second. Pause time is 0.
  • - Traffic Mode data packet arrivals as Poisson
  • process, with mean interarrival time 0.5,
    1, 1.5
  • and 2 seconds. Packet length is randomly
    set as
  • exponential (1024).

99
Performance of Components Route Discovery (cont)
1. Path Storage vs Neighbor Storage
  • Path Discovery Overhead Average number of
    routing packets received / each RREQ replied
  • Path Discovery Failure Ratio Portion of
    unreplied RREQs to total RREQs generated

Path Discovery Overhead
Path Discovery Failure Ratio
Mobility speed (m/s)
Mobility speed (m/s)
  • Path Storage contributes to
  • reduce Path Discovery Overhead (Inefficiency)
  • decrease Path Discovery Failure

100
Correlation Between System Metrics and Component
Metrics
  • How component influences system performance?
  • Analyze correlation between values of component
    metrics and system metrics.
  • Detach system metrics (e.x End to End Delay) to
    percentage of each components metrics(e.x Path
    Discovery Delay).
  • Figure out bottleneck component.
  • Trace Data Packet
  • Differentiate each component .
  • Record component metrics value.

101
Packet Registration Table
  • Create registration table for each component.
  • Route Discovery Component Pkt_Enroll_Route_Disc.
  • Route Maintenance Component Pkt_Enroll_Route_Main
    t.
  • Data Packet Forwarding Pkt_Enroll_Data_Forward.
  • Topology Database Maintenance Pkt_Enroll_Topo_Mai
    nt.

Route Discovery Component
Pkt_Enroll_Route_Disc
Register to
Route Maintenance Component
Pkt_Enroll_Route_Maint
Data Pkt
Topology Database Component
Pkt_Enroll_Data_Forward
Packet Forwarding Component
Pkt_Enroll_Topo_Maint
102
Route Discovery Delay vs End to End Delay
  • Simulation Scenarios
  • Network Topology 20 nodes in 2 x 2 km.
  • Traffic Mode Data Traffic (12,000 bytes/sec)
  • Voice Traffic (57,000
    bytes/sec)
  • Video Traffic (698,000 bytes/sec)
  • Mobility Random way point, mobility speed varied
    at 0, 15 and 30 meters/second. Pause time is 0.

103
Route Discovery Delay vs End to End Delay (cont.)
Video Traffic (698,000 bytes/sec)
Proportion of Route Discovery Delay to E2E Delay
(percentage)
Mobility Speed (meters/sec)
0 15 30
  • As mobility speed is increased, Route Discovery
    Delay has higher proportion of End to End Delay.

104
Route Discovery Delay vs End to End Delay (cont.)
Mobility Speed 15 meters/sec
Proportion of Route Discovery Delay to E2E Delay
(percentage)
data voice video
Traffic Type (Bit Rate)
  • As bit rate is increased, Route Discovery Delay
    has higher proportion of End to End Delay.

105
Route Discovery Delay vs End to End Delay (cont.)
Proportion of Route Discovery Delay to E2E Delay
(percentage)
0 15 30
data voice video
  • Generally, proportion of Route Discovery Delay
    will be increased along with increasing bit rate
    and mobility speed.

106
Outline
  • Networks
  • Constrained Coalitional Games
  • Iterative Dynamics on Graph
  • Trust and Collaboration
  • Direct and Indirect Trust Computation
  • Component Based Networking
  • Network Design and Trade-offs

107
MANET Network Design-Dimensioning
Fundamental Trade-Off Benefits vs Cost of
Collaboration
  • Formal Hybrid Models (Component Based Networking)
  • Performance Models (Rates Throughput, packet
    losses, delays)
  • Sensitivity Computation and Trade offs (Automatic
    Differentiation / Infinitesimal Perturbation
    Analysis / Cross Entropy)
  • and UMD CONSOL-OPTCAD, ILOG CPLEX-SOLVER

Performance Metrics and sensitivities
AD/IPA/CE processor
Topology-Mobility Traffic patterns and
matrix Network Conditions QoS
Protocol components Design parameters and
architecture
Performance Models
Multi-objective designer/optimizer
CBN Formal Models
Routing Protocol MAC Protocol Flow Control
Protocol
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